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Abstract 
Prior information security studies have largely focused on understanding employee security behavior 
from a policy compliance perspective. We contend that there is a pressing need to develop a 
comprehensive understanding of the circumstances that lead to employee commitment of deliberate 
and malicious acts against organizational digital assets. Drawing on routine activity theory (RAT), 
we seek to establish a comprehensive model of employee-committed malicious computer abuse 
(MCA) by investigating the motivations of the offenders, the suitability of the desired targets, and 
the effect of security guardianship in organizational settings. Specifically, we delineate the effects of 
the individual characteristics of self-control, hacking self-efficacy, and moral beliefs, as well as the 
organizational aspects of deterrence based on the routine activity framework of crime. We tested this 
research model using research participants holding a wide range of corporate positions and 
possessing varying degrees of computer skills. Our findings offer fresh insights on insider security 
threats, identify new directions for future research, and provide managers with prescriptive guidance 
for formulating effective security policies and management programs for preventing MCA in 
organizations. 
Keywords: Routine Activity Theory, Information Security, Insider Threat, Malicious Computer 
Abuse, Security Management 
Suprateek Sarker was the accepting senior editor. This research article was submitted on November 1, 2017 and 
underwent three revisions.  
1 Introduction 
Insider threats to organizational information security 
are becoming increasingly significant concerns for 
government agencies, as epitomized, for example, by 
the widely publicized Chelsea Manning (Savage & 
Huetteman, 2013) and Edward Snowden (Gellma, 
Blake, & Miller, 2013) incidents. Insider security 
threats are also prevalent and serious in organizations 
of all sizes and in all industries. According to a recent 
survey, 89% of respondents felt that their organizations 
were at risk from insider attacks, and 34% felt very or 
extremely vulnerable (Kellett, 2015). A CERT (2016) 
report suggests that although only 23% of electronic 
crime events were suspected or known to be caused by 
insiders, 45% of the respondents thought that damage 
by insider attacks was more severe than that from 
outsiders. 
It is therefore no coincidence that many information 
systems (IS) scholars have studied information 
security from the perspectives of understanding and 
managing insider threats to organizations, especially 
regarding the information security behavior of 
employees who have routine access to organizational 
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data and information systems. IS researchers have 
studied information security threats of internal 
employees since the early 1990s (see a summary of the 
literature in Appendix A). One common insight from 
these prior studies is that internal employees represent 
one of the greatest threats to an organization’s 
information security, as they are closest to the 
organizational data and information (Whitman & 
Mattord, 2005). As such, human factors are more 
likely to cause serious security breaches than 
technological vulnerabilities and are often deemed the 
weakest link in corporate information security defense. 
Most extant behavioral IS security studies have 
endeavored to employ theories from various 
disciplines (e.g., fear appeal, general deterrence theory, 
theory of planned behavior, rational choice theory, 
social learning theory, etc.) to understand and analyze 
cybersecurity issues related to insiders, such as 
employees’ information security precaution-taking 
behavior, employees’ compliance with or violation of 
policies, employees’ security awareness programs, 
employees’ motivations to perform computer abuse, 
and effects of organizational sanctions (see Appendix 
A).  
While these studies have significantly enriched our 
understanding of employee security behavior in this 
context, our literature review shows that most of these 
studies have focused on employee security behaviors 
or deviant acts with nonmalicious intent (see Appendix 
A). Unintentional and nonmalicious violations of 
organizational information security policies and 
procedures by employees could dramatically weaken 
multilayered security defense systems and expose the 
vulnerabilities of security defense to both internal and 
external threats. But, in reality, it often requires 
deliberate actions by either internal or external actors 
with malicious intent to take advantage of these 
vulnerabilities and weaknesses in a way that causes 
security breaches and significant economic, social, and 
political damage to organizations. Thus, we argue that 
there is a significant need to advance this line of 
research in order to capture and assess the crucial 
factors that lead to employees committing computer-
related abuse with malicious intent in organizations. 
To differentiate this study from prior research that 
studies employee violations of information security 
policies (ISPs) which may or may not be malicious, we 
choose malicious computer abuse (MCA) by insiders 
as the focal phenomenon and dependent variable of this 
research. We define MCA as deliberate and malicious 
digital asset abuse that violates established 
organizational policies (Willison and Warkentin, 
2013). More specifically, MCA refers to activities 
where computers and systems are used as tools by 
offenders to target, access, transfer, or alter restricted 
organizational data or information for fraudulent and 
perhaps unlawful purposes. 
Because MCA committed by individuals either inside 
or outside an organization becomes cybercrime when 
federal and/or state laws are violated, as they often do, 
in searching for a strong theoretical foundation for our 
research, we naturally gravitated to criminology as a 
primary reference discipline for understanding this 
phenomenon. After a thorough review of commonly 
used criminological theories in the literature, a widely 
acclaimed and tested general crime theory, routine 
activity theory (RAT) (Cohen & Felson, 1979), 
emerged as a salient theoretical framework to 
contextualize and build a theory-based empirical 
model for understanding MCA committed by 
employee insiders. This is because those 
organizational insiders are often privileged 
information systems users, whose routine 
organizational activities converge in time and space 
with sensitive and valuable digital assets in their 
organization, and according to RAT, are afforded rich 
and unique situational opportunities for committing 
MCA. 
RAT was developed by Cohen and Felson (1979) to 
explain the variation in national crime rates over time 
and in different geographic regions between 1947-
1974, when significant economic and sociological 
trend shifts occurred in the United States following 
World War II. Cohen and Felson (1979) argue that 
structural changes in daily routines in society influence 
crime opportunities and, therefore, affect crime rates 
and crime trends at regional and national levels. The 
central proposition of RAT is that criminal acts result 
from the convergence in time and space of three key 
elements: motivated offenders, suitable targets, and the 
absence of capable guardians to prevent criminal acts 
(Cohen & Felson, 1979). Crime opportunities emerge 
when a motivated offender has the opportunity to 
interact with a suitable target in the absence of capable 
guardians, given a physical location conducive to such 
an interaction. RAT implicitly assumes that (1) there 
are three key elements of crime (offender motivation, 
suitable target, and absence of capable guardian) but 
identifies no specific factors that contribute to the 
formation of these elements; (2) there is a constant 
supply of motivated offenders with criminal 
inclination (Pratt, Holtfreter, & Reisig, 2010); (3) these 
offenders are rational decision makers who evaluate 
the suitability of a target and the absence of capable 
guardianship; and (4) when the three key elements of 
crime converge in time and space, a crime occurs. 
In recent years, criminologists have attempted to adapt 
RAT from the physical world to the virtual world in 
order to explain the dramatic emergence of cybercrime 
(e.g., Leukfeldt & Yar, 2016; Yar, 2005). However, 
empirical support for the validity of RAT in cyberspace 
has been mixed. The wide variety of cybercrimes 
examined and the issues in the operationalization of 
RAT constructs in these studies may have contributed 
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to the mixed findings (Leukfeldt & Yar, 2016). 
Further, these RAT-based criminological studies 
almost exclusively focus on the victims or 
victimization (Leukfeldt & Yar, 2016; Wilcox & 
Cullen, 2018), trying to understand how the 
characteristics of individual internet users and their 
personal security measures affect their chances of 
being victimized. Diverging from these previous 
studies, we shift the attention to the protection of 
organizational digital assets and focus on motivated 
offenders, or insiders who commit malicious acts 
against their organizational data and systems. 
Moreover, prior studies based on RAT have generally 
treated crime motivation (i.e., the motivated offender) 
as a given without explicitly identifying the 
motivational sources. As suggested in the literature 
summary in Appendix A, our study is the first that 
operationalizes and empirically tests the underlying 
dimensions of all three pillars of crime articulated in 
RAT in the context of MCA in organizational settings. 
This study is also among the first that extends and 
contextualizes the RAT framework by identifying 
antecedents and moderators for the core RAT 
constructs and relationships. Therefore, the major 
research questions that drive this study are:  
1. How and why are employees motivated to 
commit MCA at the workplace?   
2. What and how are organizational and 
computer system factors conducive to MCA in 
an organization?  
By contextualizing RAT in organizational information 
security settings, integrating with other theories of 
crime, and validating the resulting comprehensive 
insider security behavioral model with data from a 
wide range of employee subjects, we hope to make a 
significant contribution to a comprehensive 
understanding of insider MCA and a significant 
improvement of information security management 
practices. 
2 Theoretical Development 
2.1 Malicious Computer Abuse and 
Routine Activity Theory 
As a well-established criminological theory, RAT has 
attracted significant interest in criminology and has 
been subjected to numerous empirical studies. RAT’s 
simple analytical framework allows for 
straightforward applications in a variety of criminal 
activities and its clear guidance allows for the 
development of policies and crime prevention 
initiatives (Leukfeldt & Yar, 2016). RAT has been 
used to examine various crimes, from burglary (Cohen 
& Felson, 1979) to automobile theft (Rice & Csmith, 
2002). With the advent of digital computer and 
networking technologies, RAT has been further 
adapted to various digital contexts to explain 
cybercrimes, such as consumer fraud targeting online 
shoppers (Pratt et al., 2010), cyberstalking (Reyns, 
Henson, & Fisher, 2011), and identity theft (Reyns, 
2013). Holsapple et al. (2008) applied the theory to 
provide an explanation of software piracy. Willison 
(2006) analyzed a case associated with the Barings 
Bank collapse, using RAT to understand the effect of 
organizational context on computer crimes committed 
by insiders. Wang et al. (2015) analyzed computer log 
files to understand the effect of target properties and 
guardianship on the risk of insider threats. However, 
no prior studies have operationalized all three key 
elements in RAT and empirically examined MCA by 
insiders with datasets that include both behavioral and 
physical characteristics of the criminal elements. 
RAT emphasizes the importance of both motivation 
and situational opportunities for crimes to occur. Prior 
studies have used RAT as the conceptual foundation to 
develop contextualized versions of RAT, also called 
situational opportunity theories of crime (Wilcox & 
Cullen, 2018). Opportunities are highly crime specific, 
requiring the examination of the immediate crime 
context (Clarke, 2012). These different strands of 
situational opportunity theories are essentially RAT 
extended to different opportunistic contexts that induce 
offending (Wilcox & Cullen, 2018). One such strand 
focuses on how situational crime opportunities help 
explain the concentration of crimes in certain physical 
spaces (Wilcox & Cullen, 2018). For example, 
Brantingham and Brantingham (2008) propose a crime 
pattern theory, arguing that suitable targets for 
traditional crimes tend to fall within the familiar 
physical space of offenders. 
Despite the wide recognition of the importance of 
situational opportunities, Wilcox and Cullen (2018) 
point out some issues regarding unresolved 
specification suffered by situational opportunity 
theories of crime, such as how situational opportunity 
may mediate the effect of low self-control. One 
strategy suggested by Wilcox and Cullen (2018) for 
addressing the unresolved specification is to use a 
hybrid approach, i.e., using traditional criminological 
theories to enrich opportunity theories. To answer the 
call for the hybrid approach and to highlight features 
of malicious computer abuse opportunities, we 
integrate relevant constructs in other criminological 
theories and follow the research on theory 
contextualization (Hong et al., 2014; Johns, 2006, 
2017) to build a contextualized version of RAT for 
employee MCA of organizational digital assets. 
There are two general approaches for theory 
contextualization, i.e., single context vs. cross-context 
(Hong et al., 2014). The former contextualizes a 
general theory in a single context by adding, removing, 
and/or decomposing its core constructs and by 
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integrating context-relevant antecedents and 
moderators into the theory. The cross-context approach 
attempts to replicate theoretical models in different 
contexts and then apply theory-grounded meta-
analyses to consolidate the findings to build a context-
contingent theory. Hong et al. (2014) proposed six 
guidelines for single-context theory contextualization 
(see details in Section 4 of their paper). In this study, 
we adopted the single-context approach and took five 
steps to enrich our RAT-based core framework with 
context-specific antecedents and moderators. Table 1 
summarizes these steps and the mapping to the 
guidelines suggested by Hong et al. (2014). Besides the 
above steps, we also tested the research model under 
three different MCA situational scenarios (see details 
in Section 4). The three scenarios provide further 
contextual richness for the occurrence of MCAs.  
As our study focuses on the factors that lead individual 
employees to commit MCA at the workplace, we take 
an insider perspective when applying RAT. In 
particular, we consider MCA at the workplace as the 
result of individual employees with offending 
motivations who make calculative assessments based 
on their assessment of target suitability (accessibility, 
usability, and visibility) and the level of guardianship 
(e.g., security policies, law enforcement, and security 
technologies in place). Therefore, as illustrated in 
Figure 1, we argue, based on RAT, that an employee’s 
intention to commit MCA is driven by three essential 
but independent forces: (1) the offender motivation, (2) 
the target suitability, and (3) the guardianship provided 
to the target. These three forces could take different 
forms for different types of deviant acts in different 
social and organizational contexts. For example, when 
evaluating target suitability in the context of a street 
crime, a potential offender would likely consider the 
physical size of the target, whereas, for MCA, the 
accessibility of the data may be a primary 
consideration. In the following subsections, we further 
articulate the specific forms of each driving force in the 
context of MCA in organizations.
 
Table 1. Summary of Theory Contextualization Following the Guidelines by Hong et al. (2014). 
 Mapping Guideline  
(Hong et al., 2014) 
Activities Performed in this Study 
Step 0 Guideline 1: Identify a general theory and 
use it as the basis to guide the theory 
contextualization.  
Select RAT as the general theory. 
Step 1 Guideline 3: Thorough evaluation of the 
context to identify context-specific factors. 
Identify context-specific subdimensions of the three RAT core 
constructs since opportunities that enable traditional crimes are 
quite different from those enabling MCA.  
Step 2 Guideline 3: Thorough evaluation of the 
context to identify context-specific factors. 
Identify contextual factors that influence the core constructs of 
RAT. In particular, we identified four such factors, i.e., low self-
control, hack self-efficacy, deterrence, and personal moral 
beliefs based on criminological literature. 
Step 3 Guideline 4: Modeling context-specific 
factors. 
Model context-specific subdimensions identified in Step 2 as the 
formative indicators of these three RAT core constructs.  
Step 4 Guideline 4: Modeling context-specific 
factors.  
Model low self-control, hacking self-efficacy, and deterrence as 
the direct antecedents of the RAT core constructs and explicitly 
test the mediating effects of RAT core constructs. 
Step 5 Guideline 5: Examination of the interplay 
between the IT artifact and other factors 
Model personal moral beliefs as a moderator that conditions the 
effect of RAT core constructs on MCA intention. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Conceptual Model Based on RAT 
Offender 
Motivation 
Target 
Suitability 
Absence of 
Capable 
Guardian 
Intention to 
Commit 
Malicious Acts 
against Target 
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2.2 Offender Motivation 
RAT suggests that a crime needs an offender who is 
motivated to commit the criminal act. However, RAT 
assumes the existence of such motivated offenders 
without specifying the underlying forces that may 
transform an ordinary individual into a motivated 
offender (Cohen & Felson, 1979; Yar, 2005). It is not 
clear how offender motivation develops and congeals in 
an individual to facilitate such a transformation. Since 
we cannot assume that every employee in an 
organization is a motivated offender, understanding how 
an ordinary employee becomes a motivated offender is 
paramount to information security theory and practice. 
To fill the gap, we draw on the information systems and 
criminology literatures to explore offender motivation in 
organizational settings. 
Offenders usually engage in crimes because of self-
interest, which is defined as anything that the offenders 
perceive to be of personal value or personally beneficial 
(Herbert, Green, & Larrogoite, 1998). The recognized 
motivations for crime range from material benefits to 
noneconomic gains (Burt & Simons, 2003), involving 
both intrinsic as well as extrinsic motivations. The 
offenders could be motivated by extrinsic values such as 
financial gains from the illegal acts as well as intrinsic 
benefits such as thrill, esteem, status, and peer-group 
acceptance (Burt & Simons, 2003; Cohen, Kluegel, & 
Land, 1981). However, not all offenders are susceptible 
to the influence of intrinsic and extrinsic values of 
deviant acts to the same degree; individual self-control 
appears to play a significant role in the evaluation of 
intrinsic and extrinsic values and thus in the formation 
of offender motivation (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990; 
Hu et al., 2011). In addition to extrinsic and intrinsic 
values expected from committing a deviant act, the 
motivation of an offender may also entail the assessment 
of harmfulness to others, given that lack of harmfulness 
is often used by offenders to justify their actions 
according to neutralization theory (Siponen & Vance, 
2010). For example, those who commit computer crimes 
were found to deny the harmfulness of their actions 
(Parker, 1998). In a study of white-collar crimes, 
offenders convicted of economic offenses unanimously 
denied that their actions were motivated by a criminal 
mind or victimizing intent (Benson, 1985). Therefore, 
lack of harmfulness may act as another key dimension 
inherent in the motivation of insider offenders. 
2.3 Target Suitability  
A suitable target refers to a person or an object that is 
attractive and available as a victim to the offender 
(Cohen & Felson, 1979; Felson, 1998). An offender is 
assumed to be a rational decision maker who assesses 
the value and availability of the target before deciding 
whether to engage in a criminal act. Cohen and Felson 
(1979) and Felson (1998) articulate four different 
target suitability measures based on the potential 
offender’s viewpoint: value (V), inertia (I), visibility 
(V), and access (A) of the target, or VIVA. In essence, 
they argue that target suitability is likely to reflect such 
things as the material or symbolic value of a personal or 
property target for offenders, the inertia of the target 
against illegal treatment by offenders (including the 
weight, size, and attached or locked features of property 
inhibiting its removal, as well as the physical capacity of 
personal victims to resist criminal acts with or without 
weapons), the physical visibility of the target, and easy 
access to and away from the offense location. 
The three properties of suitable targets, i.e., inertia, 
physical visibility, and easy access to and away from the 
offense location are contextualized to “street crimes” 
that involve physical objects. To adapt these properties 
to the MCA context targeted at digital assets within an 
organization, we operationalize target suitability as the 
perceived suitability of digital assets based on potential 
offenders’ evaluation of their accessibility, visibility, 
and usability. The rationale for such operationalization 
is discussed in detail below. 
In the context of MCA in organizations, accessibility 
refers to the extent to which a potential offender has 
access to the target (i.e., access to digital assets, either 
authorized or unauthorized). The inside offender can use 
internal computers to bypass or penetrate organizational 
cybersecurity defense to gain access to digital targets. In 
addition, the potential offender can utilize various 
technologies (e.g., anonymous remailer, encryption 
tools, third-party servers, and systems) to maintain 
anonymity and strengthen the level of accessibility, thus 
providing the potential offender with the ability to get 
away easily in the context of the digital environment. 
Another tenet of target suitability is visibility. RAT 
indicates that the level of target visibility increases the 
target suitability (Yar, 2005). In the context of MCA in 
an organization, visibility refers to the extent to which a 
potential offender becomes aware of the existence of a 
valuable digital target and knows where the desired 
target resides (e.g., a document folder, a database 
server). According to Yar (2005), “the typology of 
cyberspace is largely unlimited by barriers of physical 
distance, this renders virtually present entities visible, 
hence advertising their existence to the possible pool of 
motivated offenders” (p. 421). Wang et al. (2015) 
operationalized visibility as users who are given access 
to the targeted digital assets. However, potential 
offenders may recognize the existence of valuable 
digital assets through various means such as file and 
database names, internal memos, operational 
procedures, digital portals and directories, 
advertisement, and search engines. Organizations that 
are careless about disclosing the existence or ownership 
of confidential and valuable digital assets (e.g., credit 
card records or information about individual identity, 
product design, and key manufacturing know-how) are 
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likely to attract the attention of both internal and external 
offenders. 
The inertia of crime targets is another component of 
target suitability, which refers to the physical properties 
of objects (e.g., weight and volume) that might offer 
varying degrees of resistance to effective predation 
(Cohen & Felson, 1979; Felson, 1998). Although the 
targets of MCA do not possess such physical properties, 
digital goods could retain inertial properties to some 
degree. For example, Yar (2005) notes that the level of 
inertia of digital targets may be impacted by the volume 
of a target (e.g., file size) if the potential offender has 
limited technological means (e.g., insufficient storage 
capacity or limited network bandwidth). However, 
given the abundance of high- capacity storage devices 
and high-speed digital networks in today’s digital 
environment, the issue of file size has become less 
significant.  
In the context of MCA, we expand the concept of 
physical inertia to digital usability of the target and 
define it as the degree to which the potential offender 
can appropriate the information contained in the target 
once it is acquired. Copying an encrypted database 
without being able to decrypt the data or having just one 
fraction of the data while the rest is distributed over 
multiple servers in multiple locations would render the 
target useless to the offender. In this vein, we predict that 
the usability issue of the encrypted digital target is likely 
to weaken the level of target suitability. Usability could 
be considered as digitally equivalent to physical inertia. 
2.4 Security Guardianship 
RAT assumes that a motivated offender assesses the 
level of security guardianship of the target before 
deciding whether to commit a crime. In this study, we 
refer to security guardianship as a set of organizational 
security measures, policies, controls, and programs for 
protecting digital assets. This construct is distinct from 
technical measures designed to reduce the suitability of 
specific targets such as encryption. To protect digital 
assets against potential computer abuse, most 
organizations have established security policies and 
guidelines to delineate penalties and disciplinary actions 
and rely on monitoring software and hardware to detect 
violations of these security policies. Organizations also 
implement security education, training, and awareness 
(SETA) programs (D’Arcy, Hovav, & Galletta, 2009; 
Karjalainen & Siponen, 2011). SETA programs are 
necessary not only for increasing employee awareness 
of security policies and enforcement measures but also 
to help employees understand the reasons underlying the 
security policies and the consequences of security 
violations. Security policies and controls, computer and 
network monitoring, and SETA programs are all 
necessary and complementary components serving as 
the cornerstones of security guardianship. Therefore, we 
operationalize the construct of absence of capable 
guardianship in three subdimensions, i.e., the absence of 
security policies, security monitoring, and SETA 
programs. When present, these tools can effectively 
convey the appropriate security conduct for ordinary 
employees (D’Arcy et al., 2009). 
3 Research Model and Hypotheses 
To facilitate the development of our research 
hypotheses, we first present a parsimonious RAT model 
(Figure 1) that delineates the roles of offender 
motivation, target suitability, and absence of capable 
guardianship in the formation of an individual’s MCA 
intention. We now present a contextualized model 
(Figure 2) by integrating two sets of exogenous 
variables to the core RAT model in order to address the 
major issues of the RAT framework discussed above. 
 
 
Figure 2. Research Model 
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In this model, we suggest that an employee’s intention 
to commit MCA is the result of a calculative 
assessment of target suitability and security 
guardianship by the motivated offender in the presence 
of the moderators and antecedents of the three key 
RAT constructs. The construct of individual moral 
beliefs is introduced as an important moderator 
constraining the effects of three core constructs in 
RAT, while an employee’s criminal propensity (i.e., 
low self-control), capability of committing MCA (i.e., 
hacking self-efficacy), and deterrence measures are 
used as the antecedents of the core RAT constructs.  
We postulate that employees are more motivated to 
commit computer abuse when they possess low self-
control and/or have high hacking self-efficacy. This 
model also suggests that target suitability as perceived 
by the potential offender is inevitably subject to the 
influence of the low self-control and hacking self-
efficacy of the potential offender. The assessment of 
security guardianship by potential offenders is 
influenced by hacking self-efficacy and deterrence 
measures in an organization. Deterrence measures, 
such as the probability of being caught and the speed 
and severity of punishment, should help inform 
potential offenders about the level of security 
guardianship deployed in the organization. In addition, 
deterrence likely factors into potential offenders’ 
assessment of target suitability because strong 
deterrence should make the target less suitable for 
MCA. These hypothesized relationships are shown in 
Figure 2 and elaborated in more detail in the following 
subsections. 
3.1 Core Relationships in Routine 
Activity Theory 
According to RAT, the occurrence of a crime is the 
result of a convergence of a motivated offender, a 
suitable target, and the absence of a capable guardian 
for the target in time and space (Cohen & Felson, 
1979). All three factors are considered essential for a 
criminal act to occur. Drawing on RAT, we argue that 
employees are motivated to commit malicious 
computer abuse when they discover that digital assets 
in corporate computer systems are valuable, and they 
further develop an intention to commit MCA when 
digital assets are perceived to be useful, visible and 
accessible, and when the security protections for the 
assets are inadequate or even absent. In order to better 
operationalize the construct of “absence of capable 
guardianship,” we refer to the “presence of capable 
guardianship” in this research. Guardianship, e.g., in 
the form of SETA programs, influences computer 
abuse intention “by simple presence to prevent crimes 
and by absence to make crime more likely” (Hollis-
Peel et al., 2011). Therefore, following the logic of 
RAT, we propose that: 
H1: An employee’s offending motivation is positively 
related to the employee’s intention to commit 
MCA in organizational settings. 
H2: An employee’s perceived target suitability of 
digital assets is positively related to the 
employee’s intention to commit MCA in 
organizational settings.  
H3: An employee’s perceived presence of capable 
guardianship for the targeted digital assets is 
negatively related to the employee’s intention to 
commit MCA in organizational settings.  
3.2 Role of Moral Beliefs  
Moral beliefs refer to an individual’s beliefs about the 
normative appropriateness of a behavior, which are 
tied to one’s innate moral standards (Wenzel, 2005). 
Personal moral beliefs prohibiting deviant behaviors 
can be considered as one type of self-regulatory 
mechanism that relies on one’s intrinsic motivation to 
stay away from deviant behaviors. Those with high 
moral beliefs prohibiting a behavior will likely dismiss 
that behavior quickly or rule out that behavior as a 
possible choice of actions. Some studies have found a 
direct inhibitive impact of moral beliefs on employee 
computer abuse or ISP violations (D’Arcy & Lowry, 
2019; D’Arcy & Devaraj, 2012; Li et al., 2014; Vance 
& Siponen, 2012). According to criminology literature, 
moral beliefs could also condition the assessment of 
costs and benefits expected from committing deviant 
acts (Paternoster & Simpson, 1996). More specifically, 
the cost-benefit assessment would play a less important 
role or even exert no effect in the existence of high 
moral beliefs prohibiting certain deviant acts. Moral 
beliefs have been suggested as a moderator capable of 
adjusting individual decision-making processes to 
perform deviant behaviors in many different contexts, 
such as corporate crimes (Paternoster & Simpson, 
1996), tax evasion (Wenzel, 2005), and internet abuse 
in the workplace (Li et al., 2010). D’Arcy et al. (2009) 
included moral beliefs as a control variable for 
predicting information security misuses but confirmed 
its moderating role in a post hoc analysis.  
Until now, the moderating role of personal moral 
beliefs has only received minimal attention in 
information security studies. To advance the 
understanding of the moderating role of moral beliefs 
and answer the recent call for more contextualized 
theory building (Hong et al., 2014; Johns, 2017), we 
incorporate moral beliefs as a contextual moderator 
instead of a direct antecedent, which helps us glean 
more context-sensitive insights into the relationship 
between core RAT constructs and MCA intentions.  
In this study, we define moral beliefs as an employee’s 
normative beliefs about whether it is right or wrong to 
commit computer abuse against organizations. 
Presumably, an employee would be less attracted to 
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computer abuse opportunities and less influenced by 
target suitability and security guardianship if the 
employee believed it was morally wrong to do engage 
in such abuse. Thus, we anticipate that the effects of 
offender motivation, a suitable target, and the absence 
of a capable guardian are conditioned on personal 
moral beliefs prohibiting MCA. Therefore,  
H4a: An employee’s moral beliefs prohibiting MCA 
negatively moderate the relationship between 
the employee’s MCA motivation and MCA 
intention. 
H4b: An employee’s moral beliefs prohibiting MCA 
negatively moderate the relationship between 
the perceived target suitability and MCA 
intention. 
H4c: An employee’s moral beliefs prohibiting MCA 
positively moderate the relationship between the 
perceived presence of capable guardianship and 
MCA intention. 
3.3 Role of Low Self-Control 
Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) articulate a general 
theory of crime centered on the concept of low self-
control, also known as self-control theory. They define 
low self-control (LSC) as the tendency of individuals 
to act on impulse and with little regard for long-term 
consequences. This theory provides an important and 
unique view of the sources of crime and deviant 
behavior. LSC can explain various forms of crimes, 
from acts of physical violence to white-collar fraud, 
that individuals pursue their own interest in various 
social and organizational settings. Prior studies in 
information security suggest that one’s MCA 
motivation could be influenced by this characteristic of 
low self-control (Hu et al., 2011). Those with LSC are 
shown to be more responsive to immediate 
gratification from crimes such as rewards, pleasures, 
and thrills (Wright, 2004). They were found to be more 
motivated to violate digital privacy to seek thrill and 
excitement (Morris & Higgins, 2008). Therefore, we 
anticipate that LSC fortifies one’s motivation to 
commit MCA. At the same time, it has been suggested 
that LSC influences perceived characteristics of crime 
opportunities such as the accessibility and 
vulnerability of targets (Nagin & Paternoster, 1993). 
LSC, being associated with low ability to see the 
potential costs associated with criminal acts, has been 
found to significantly reduce the perceived costs of 
deviant acts (Vaughan et al., 2019). Such biased cost 
estimation may make the potential offender believe 
that a target is more suitable than it actually is. Hence, 
we posit that: 
H5a: An employee’s low self-control is positively 
related to the employee’s MCA motivation. 
H5b: An employee’s low self-control is positively 
related to the employee’s perceived target 
suitability of digital assets. 
3.4 Role of Hacking Self-Efficacy  
We use hacking self-efficacy to evaluate an 
individual’s mental ability to commit MCA. 
Originating from social cognitive theory (Bandura, 
1986), self-efficacy refers to an individual’s beliefs 
about his or her capabilities to produce designated 
levels of performance. Self-efficacy is domain specific 
and can thus vary across activities requiring different 
skills and resources (Bandura, 1997). In the context of 
IS, computer self-efficacy is considered to be an 
important factor related to the acquisition of computing 
skills and adaptation to new information technology 
(Compeau & Higgins, 1995). Previous studies on self-
efficacy have mostly focused on the context of 
conventional tasks such as job performance, and have 
devoted little attention to antisocial behaviors such as 
crime (Brezina & Topalli, 2012). It is not clear how 
crime-related self-efficacy would influence offenders’ 
decision-making processes.  
To fill this research gap, we introduce the construct of 
hacking self-efficacy, which is specific to the MCA 
context, and examine it as the antecedent for core RAT 
constructs driving MCA decisions. Following Wood 
and Bandura (1989), we define hacking self-efficacy as 
the belief in one’s ability to mobilize the motivation, 
cognitive resources, and courses of action needed to 
gain access to desired digital assets. The emphasis is 
on whether an individual employee believes she or he 
has the required knowledge, skill, or ability to commit 
MCA in the organization. Such efficacy beliefs have 
caused many offenders of physical crimes to express 
pride in their ability to exploit crime opportunities, 
such as compromising locking devices and alarms 
(Brezina & Topalli, 2012).  
In the context of MCA, hacking self-efficacy is 
expected to influence employees’ assessment of crime 
opportunities in terms of suitability of the desired 
digital target and effectiveness of security 
guardianship in organizations. Therefore, we argue 
that heightened hacking self-efficacy may cause an 
employee to believe that he or she has the ability to 
overcome technical challenges and to perceive that 
little effort is needed to commit MCA in the 
organization. We posit that employees with a high 
level of hacking self-efficacy will be more likely to 
activate their MCA motivations and perceive digital 
assets to be relatively easy to compromise, thus 
judging them to be suitable potential targets. Along the 
same line, heightened hacking ability may cause 
motivated offenders to perceive relatively weak levels 
of security guardianship of the digital asset targets. 
Thus, we hypothesize: 
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H6a: An employee’s hacking self-efficacy is 
positively related to the employee’s MCA 
motivation. 
H6b: An employee’s hacking self-efficacy is 
positively related to the perceived target 
suitability of digital assets. 
H6c: An employee’s hacking self-efficacy is 
negatively related to the perceived presence of 
capable guardianship for digital assets. 
3.5 Role of Deterrence 
Deterrence measures such as formal sanctions are 
enacted by organizations or law enforcement agencies 
and have been widely examined as a mechanism for 
deterring criminal behaviors in various contexts such 
as corporate crimes (Paternoster & Simpson, 1996), 
information systems misuse (D’Arcy et al., 2009), and 
information security (Hu et al., 2011). Deterrence 
focuses on punishments such as demotion, job 
termination, or prosecution, which would increase the 
cost of criminal behaviors. The effect of deterrence has 
been mostly examined through individuals’ 
perceptions about detection probability and sanction 
severity, as well as sanction celerity or the speed of 
punishment (Antia et al., 2006; Howe & Brandau, 
1988; Howe & Loftus, 1996; Simpson & Koper, 1992). 
All three dimensions of deterrence have received some 
support in reducing criminal behaviors. For example, 
detection probability has been negatively related to 
software piracy (Peace, Galletta, & Thong, 2003) and 
the abuse of internet access in the workplace (Li et al., 
2010). A high level of perceived sanction severity has 
been found to reduce the misuse of IS assets (D’Arcy 
et al., 2009) and increase compliance with security 
policies (Herath & Rao, 2009). However, Hu et al. 
(2011) show that the effectiveness of deterrence in 
organizational information security settings is 
insignificant based on a rational choice behavioral 
framework.  
According to RAT, motivated offenders assess the 
degree of guardianship or form awareness of various 
security countermeasures before engaging in a 
criminal act. From an individual’s perspective, those 
motivated offenders would estimate the probability of 
their being caught by the organization (i.e., perceived 
detection probability). Also, they would estimate the 
severity and the speed of punishments should they get 
caught (i.e., perceived sanction severity and celerity). 
As these deterrence dimensions constitute threats to 
human assets (Johnson et al., 2015), they should help 
inform potential offenders about the level of security 
guardianship deployed in the organization. A 
heightened focus on deterrence should increase 
employees’ awareness of security guardianships. In an 
organization with strong and clear deterrence 
mechanisms, employees are more likely to perceive 
high levels of security guardianship and view digital 
assets to be more difficult to compromise. Therefore, 
we propose: 
H7a: An employee’s perceived deterrence against 
MCA is negatively related to the employee’s 
perceived target suitability of digital assets. 
H7b: An employee’s perceived deterrence against 
MCA is positively related to the employee’s 
perceived presence of capable guardianship of 
digital assets. 
3.6 Control Variables 
While the three elements in the RAT model may 
explain the primary antecedents of MCA intentions, 
other significant factors should not be ignored. For 
example, employment status (part-time vs. full-time) 
may play a role in influencing MCA intentions because 
of factors related to time, experience, and exposure to 
digital assets. Different from the context of volitional 
noncompliance of organizational security policies, IS 
security experience may increase an insider’s intention 
to commit MCA as well because employees who know 
a great deal about the security technology and practices 
of the organization may have more MCA 
opportunities. In addition, age and gender have often 
been included to explain IS misuses (Leonard & 
Cronan, 2001; Leonard, Cronan, & Kreie, 2004). For 
example, men have been shown to have higher 
intentions to misuse organizational IS resources than 
women (Leonard & Cronan, 2001). Also, younger 
people were found to be more likely to engage in 
deviant computer usage behaviors than older people 
(Gattiker & Kelley, 1999). Toward that end, we 
include four control variables for an employee’s 
intention to commit MCA at the workplace, based on 
the extant literature: age, sex, IS security experience, 
and employment status (D’Arcy et al., 2009; Hu et al., 
2011; Siponen & Vance, 2010).  
4 Research Methodology  
4.1 Measurement Instrument 
To maximize measurement reliability and validity, we 
adopted appropriate published scales to measure most of 
the latent constructs with slight rewording to reflect our 
research context. The research model includes both first-
order and second-order constructs (Table 2). 
Instruments for measuring lack of harmfulness, 
perceived accessibility, perceived visibility, and 
perceived usability were developed for this study. In 
particular, we created two items using words “harmful” 
and “damaging” and reverse coding to measure the lack 
of harmfulness of each MCA scenario. To measure 
perceived accessibility, we created three items with 
similar wording to capture how easily the confidential 
data could be accessed.  
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Table 2. Operationalization and Sources of Latent Constructs. 
Second-order construct Second-order formative scale justification First-order construct Sources 
  Moral beliefs (MRB) Hu et al. (2011) 
Low self-control 
(LSC) 
The four first-order factors are not 
interchangeable and could vary 
independently. For example, risk seeking trait 
may or may not co-exist with temper.  
Impulsivity (IMP) 
Grasmick et al. 
(1993) 
Risk seeking (RSK) 
Self-centeredness (SCT) 
Temper (TMP) 
  Hacking self-efficacy (HSE) 
Gist & Mitchell 
(1987) 
Deterrence  
(DET) 
The three first-order factors represent 
different approaches for enforcing deterrence. 
They are not interchangeable and have been 
found to exert different impacts (Li et al., 
2010). 
Perceived certainty (CER) 
Antia et al. 
(2006) 
Perceived severity (SVR) 
Perceived celerity (CEL) 
Offender motivation 
(MOV) 
The three first-order factors represent 
different motivators that could drive MCA 
independently. They are not interchangeable. 
Perceived extrinsic value (PEV) 
Paternoster & 
Simpson (1996) 
Perceived intrinsic value (PIV) 
Piquero & 
Tibbetts (1996) 
Lack of harmfulness (LHM) 
Developed for 
this study 
Target suitability  
(STG) 
The three first-order factors represent 
different criteria for assessing target 
suitability. They are not interchangeable and 
do not change in the same direction. For 
example, a visible digital asset may not be 
accessible and directly usable. 
Perceived accessibility (PAC) 
Developed for 
this study Perceived visibility (PVS) 
Perceived inertia (Usability-PUS) 
Capable guardianship 
(CGS) 
The three first-order factors represent 
different security measures that are not 
interchangeable and co-vary. For example, a 
company with strong SETA program may not 
have strong monitoring.  
SETA 
 
D’Arcy et al. 
(2009) 
 
Security policies (POL) 
Computer monitoring (MOR) 
  Intention to commit MCA (INT) 
Perceived visibility consists of three items measuring the 
extent to which a subject would know where the data are 
stored if the subject were in the same situation described 
in the MCA scenario. Perceived usability consists of three 
items reflecting the extent to which the confidential data 
could be used without difficulty. The content validity and 
wording of these self-developed scales were checked by 
four domain experts before they were further validated in 
the pilot study using student subjects and the final study 
using the industrial panel operated by Qualtrics. 
We introduced five second-order factors into our research 
model. The primary purpose of using second-order 
constructs is to create a more parsimonious model that 
focuses the attention on the central arguments of RAT. All 
first-order constructs were operationalized as reflective 
constructs. Following the suggestions in Confetelli and 
Bassellier (2009) and MacKenzie, Podsakoff, and 
Podsakoff (2011), the five second-order constructs were 
implemented as formative scales. The major 
distinguishing features of a formative scale are that the 
formative indicators are not interchangeable and do not 
necessarily increase or decrease at the same time, as 
would be the case for reflective measures. These 
distinguishing features apply to all five formative scales 
in this study. Table 2 summarizes the construct measures, 
their sources, and the justification for formative second-
order scales. All constructs were measured using 7-point 
Likert scales from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly 
agree) (see Appendix B). 
4.2 Data Collection 
As noted by Holsapple et al. (2008), empirical studies 
in this context can be challenging because the nature of 
the underlying activity is illegal and may, therefore, 
cause significant issues in sample selection and 
response bias and validity. Given the nature of this 
study, it is highly unlikely that reliable data can be 
collected via voluntarily self-reported responses to 
field survey questionnaires with regard to the actual 
criminal or deviant behavior of individual employees 
in organizational settings. Thus, we adopted a 
scenario-based cross-sectional survey strategy for data 
collection.  
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In criminology research, crime scenario-based surveys 
are considered to be a more reliable and realistic approach 
than self-reported surveys, which ask whether subjects 
have actually committed crimes or illicit behavior. 
Criminology studies have used scenarios involving 
various criminal activities, such as bribery (Paternoster & 
Simpson, 1996), theft, and sexual assault (Nagin & 
Paternoster, 1993), and have delivered the crime 
scenarios to subjects that, as a majority, report no prior 
criminal offenses. Recently, IS security studies, such as 
those by D’Arcy et al. (2009), Siponen and Vance (2010), 
Hu et al. (2011, 2015), Han et al. (2015), and Vance, 
Lowry, and Eggett (2015), have employed this method to 
overcome the practical data collection challenges 
involved in studying criminal or deviant behavior in 
organizational settings, such as the difficulty of collecting 
actual behavior data or collecting data from multiple 
sources (e.g., from both managers and employees). This 
method is particularly useful for such studies because 
malicious compromise of digital assets is conducted 
secretly, making it less visible than other types of deviant 
acts. Further, due to the sensitive nature of MCA 
perpetrated by internal employees, organizations are 
typically reluctant to report such MCA incidents or share 
them with researchers (Crosslet et al., 2013; D’Arcy, 
2014). Self-reporting of actual MCA behaviors by 
employees is also problematic because employees may be 
unwilling to admit their own malicious acts because of 
social desirability concerns. To a certain extent, the 
scenario-based approach reduces the impact of social 
desirability concerns.  
In line with the practice of these prior studies, three 
fictitious situational scenarios were created for this study 
based on published literature and our own experience to 
reflect the typical types of MCA, including stealing client 
data to sell to a noncompetitor, stealing new product 
design to sell to a competitor, and stealing financial data 
to sell to an investment firm before the scheduled public 
release (see Appendix E for details). We selected these 
three scenarios in order to increase the generalizability of 
our findings to typical MCA scenarios and to induce 
variations in the antecedents of MCA. The data breaches 
in these scenarios involve different types of confidential 
data and may inflict different degrees of harm to a firm. 
For example, selling product design data to a competitor 
may be considered more harmful than disclosing client 
information to a noncompeting firm. We also explicitly 
included one question to test the perceived realism of each 
scenario in the survey. The percent of subjects who 
somewhat agreed to strongly agreed that the scenario was 
realistic in the final data collection was 64%, 54%, and 
60% for client data, product design, and financial data 
scenarios, respectively. Therefore, we determined that the 
extent of realism of the three scenarios is acceptable to 
warrant their inclusion in the data analysis (see Appendix 
B for the text of the measurement instrument). 
Prior to the final data collection, a pilot study was 
administered to 102 undergraduate and graduate students 
of three major universities across the US in order to 
evaluate the content validity and improve the clarity of the 
survey instruments. The final survey was refined based on 
the results of the pilot study. The survey was then 
distributed in an online format to the industry panel 
consisting of employees from a wide range of 
organizations and industries using the Qualtrics online 
survey platform. The Qualtrics participants were profiled 
based on hundreds of attributes (McKinney, Yoon & 
Zahedi, 2002). For our study, Qualtrics randomly 
contacted those who were organizational employees. 
Qualtrics also checked IP addresses and used a 
sophisticated digital fingerprinting technology to ensure 
that no two responses were from the same subject.  
Three question blocks were used as containers for 
scenario-specific questions, using one block for each 
scenario. One of these three blocks was randomly 
assigned to each respondent so that each respondent 
answered questions based on one scenario only. The 
scenario-specific questions included questions about 
perceived values, moral beliefs, target suitability, and 
intention to commit MCA if the respondent were in the 
same situation as the character described in the fictitious 
scenario. Besides these scenario-specific questions, 
respondents were then required to answer questions about 
demographics and questions measuring other variables. 
Despite the differences in scenarios, the sequence of 
questions was the same for all respondents. 
The identity of all survey respondents was anonymous to 
the researchers. In the final data collection lasting about 
two weeks, 660 panel members attempted to take the 
survey and 360 of them completed the questionnaire. 
After further dropping eight responses that gave the same 
answer to almost all questions, we received a total of 352 
usable responses that were used for data analysis. Among 
the 352 usable responses, the number of subjects in each 
information security scenario was 116, 128, and 108 for 
stealing client data, product design, and financial data, 
respectively. 
5 Data Analysis 
SmartPLS, a variance-based structural equation 
modeling (SEM) tool, was employed to analyze the 
measurement invariance, reliability, and validity of our 
measurement model and test the research hypotheses. 
We chose to use PLS primarily because PLS is more 
amenable for handling complex and exploratory 
research models with both reflective and formative 
constructs than covariance-based SEM techniques such 
as LISREL (Chin, 1998). In addition, PLS uses the 
bootstrap method to determine the statistical 
significance of path coefficients, which imposes less 
strict requirements on residual distributions of the 
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dataset than covariance-based SEM techniques (Chin, 
Marcolin, & Newsted, 2003). 
5.1 Demographic Characteristics 
Table 3 summarizes the demographic information of 
survey respondents. Approximately 53% of the survey 
respondents are male and 47% were female. About 
61% of the respondents were between 25-44 years of 
age, and 98% reported using the internet for over 5 
years. The respondents reported different types of job 
positions, ranging from managerial to technical 
positions. Questions about employing firm size also 
revealed a good mix of small, medium, and large firms. 
These demographic characteristics suggest that our 
sample is quite heterogeneous, which helps increase 
the external validity of our study. 
Table 3. Demographic Information of Survey Respondents 
Gender 
Age 
(Years) 
Internet Exp. 
(Years) 
Job Position 
Employment 
Status 
Firm Size 
(# Employees) 
Male:     52.6% <24:      16.5% <5:         1.7% Executive:                        8.2% Full-time:  78.4% 1-100:                  35.0% 
Female: 47.4% 25-34:   37.8% 6-10:   18.2% Manager/Supervisor:      12.8% Part-time:  21.6% 101-250:               15.4% 
 35-44:   22.7% 11-15: 39.5% IT Professional:               17.3%  251-500:              19.0% 
 45-55:   15.6% 16-20: 30.9% Admin Staff:                   24.2%  501-1,000:           10.2% 
 55+:        7.4% >20:       9.7% Business/Professional     15.3%  1,001-5,000:        11.9% 
   Technical/Engineering:     6.0%  5000+:                   8.5% 
   Other                                     16.2%   
5.2 Measurement Model 
All variance-based SEM tools model latent constructs 
as composites, which demands the test of measurement 
invariance when the dataset consists of multiple 
groups. Since we collected data using three different 
scenarios, measurement invariance is a necessary 
requirement for conducting pooled data analysis. We 
performed the MICOM procedure proposed by 
Henseler, Ringle, and Sarstedt (2016) to test 
measurement invariance and applied the same 
algorithm settings across all three scenarios. Partial 
measurement invariance is established when the 
original composite correlations are greater than or 
equal to the 5% quantile. As shown in Appendix C1, 
all latent constructs have partial measurement 
invariance. However, not all constructs have equal 
means across the scenarios, suggesting the absence of 
full measurement invariance. Thus, we could not 
perform an analysis on the pooled data across the three 
scenarios. We analyzed the three scenarios separately. 
Following typical practice in the literature, we 
deployed different procedures and criteria to test the 
measurement quality of reflective and formative 
constructs. For formative constructs, we assessed their 
measurement quality following the suggestions by 
MacKenzie, Podsakoff, and Jarvis (2005) and 
Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer (2001). We first 
examined the significance level of path weights of the 
five formative constructs. Lack of harmfulness has 
nonsignificant path weights in scenarios involving 
product design and financial data (Appendix C2). As 
suggested by prior studies, it may be necessary to retain 
nonsignificant indicators in a formative construct to 
ensure the completeness of its content domain 
(Mathieson, Peacock, & Chin, 2001). To maintain the 
content domain of offender motivation, we kept lack of 
harmfulness in the subsequent data analysis. We 
computed the variance inflation factor (VIF) to assess 
multicollinearity among first-order factors in each 
formative second-order construct. VIF values were all 
found to be below the threshold of 10 for excessive 
multicollinearity suggested by Diamantopoulos and 
Winklhofer (2001). Therefore, we conclude that 
multicollinearity is not a concern here. Overall, the 
instruments for measuring these five formative second-
order constructs were found to have reasonable 
measurement quality.  
Further comparing the weights of the first-order latent 
constructs reveals major underlying drivers for each 
second-order construct. For low self-control, 
impulsivity has the largest weight in the client 
scenario, whereas self-centeredness has the largest 
weight in the other two scenarios. For deterrence, 
perceived certainty of being caught is the most 
important subdimension for client and design scenarios 
while perceived severity of punishment is the dominant 
dimension in the financial data scenario. For offender 
motivation, perceived intrinsic value has the largest 
weights across all scenarios, followed by perceived 
extrinsic value. Lack of harmfulness is the least 
important dimension in terms of offender motivation 
and has a significant path weight only in the client 
scenario. With respect to target suitability, perceived 
accessibility has the largest weight in the client 
scenario, and perceived usability has the largest weight 
in the design and finance scenarios. Among the three 
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subdimensions of capable guardianship, computer 
monitoring has the highest weight across all scenarios, 
suggesting the importance of computer monitoring for 
deterrence. 
We then assessed the measurement quality of reflective 
scales assessed based on their reliability, convergent 
validity, and discriminant validity. Reliability is 
supported if composite reliability (CR) is above 0.7 
and average variance extracted (AVE) is above 0.5 
(Bagozzi and Yi, 1988). As shown in Appendix C2, for 
all reflective scales, CR and AVE are higher than the 
recommended threshold for reliability. Convergent 
validity is suggested when factor loadings are 
significant and equal to 0.6 or higher (Bagozzi & Yi, 
1988; Gefen & Straub, 2005). All indicators except the 
third item measuring perceived certainty (CER_3) 
were found to load significantly on their respective 
latent constructs and have loadings above 0.6. 
Therefore, we removed CER_3 and reran the data 
analysis. The following data analysis results are based 
on the remaining items without CER_3. All these 
reflective scales display sound convergent validity. We 
then tested the discriminant validity in the correlation 
matrix (Appendix C4). The square root of AVE of each 
construct should be higher than the interconstruct 
correlations (Fornell & Larcker, 1981). As shown in 
Appendix C4, all reflective constructs exhibit good 
discriminant validity.  
Akin to other survey-based cross-sectional studies, our 
study may be susceptible to common method variance 
(CMV) bias. Following Lindell and Whitney’s (2001) 
recommendation, we applied the partial correlation 
procedure based on the marker-variable technique to 
gauge the magnitude of CMV and, at the same time, 
evaluate its impact on the correlation among latent 
constructs. In particular, this procedure requires the 
selection of the second-smallest positive correlation 
among the manifest variables as a more conservative 
estimate of CMV (i.e., rm). The second smallest 
positive correlation was found to be 0.001. Therefore, 
we used 0.001 to compute CMV-adjusted correlations 
among latent constructs by partialing out rm from the 
original correlations. The CMV-adjusted correlations 
were only slightly different from the original 
correlations, with differences less than or equal to 
0.002. The significance levels for all correlations 
among latent constructs in Appendix C4 remain the 
same. Considering the small difference in t-value, we 
conclude that CMV is not a problem for our study. 
5.3 Hypothesis Testing 
Figure 3 and Table 4 summarize the results of 
hypothesis testing using SmartPLS. We performed 
bootstrapping of 5,000 samples to compute t-statistics of 
all paths in the research model. Standardized path 
coefficients are given on each path. The R2 values reflect 
the predictive power of the model. The model explains 
66.7% to 71.6% of the variance in MCA intention, 
39.9% to 51.6% of the variance in offender motivation, 
23.4% to 30.3% of the variance in target suitability, and 
53.8% to 65.8% of the variance in capable guardianship. 
This indicates an overall good fit of the model with the 
data.  
Among the four control variables, we found that men 
have higher MCA intentions than women in the selling 
design data scenario. The other variables are statistically 
nonsignificant. With respect to the explicitly 
hypothesized core RAT relationships, offender 
motivation was found to have the largest path coefficient 
and is highly significant across all three scenarios (H1, 
p < 0.001). The next important core RAT construct is 
target suitability, which is significant in the client and 
finance scenarios (H2, p < 0.05). Capable guardianship 
was not found to be significant at the 0.05 level in the 
client and financial data scenarios. Counterintuitively, 
capable guardianship exhibits significant positive 
influence over MCA intention in the design scenario.  
Next, we analyzed the moderation effect of moral beliefs 
on the core RAT relationships. We found that H4a is 
significant at the p < 0.05 level in the finance scenario 
with an effect size (f2)1 of 0.04, suggesting a small effect 
size (Cohen, 1988). H4a was found to be significant in 
the finance scenario but not the other two scenarios. H4b 
and H4c are not significant across all three scenarios. 
Despite the significance of H4a in the finance scenario, 
its sign is positive, which contradicts our hypothesis. 
The interaction pattern of H4a is shown in Figure 4. The 
dashed line (strong moral beliefs) is still below the solid 
line (weak moral beliefs) but the two lines merge at the 
position of high motivation, suggesting that the effect of 
moral beliefs prohibiting MCA exists for employees 
with low motivation but is negligible for those with high 
motivation. Clearly, high moral beliefs fail to rule out 
MCA as a possible choice of actions among highly 
motivated offenders. We found that those with high 
moral beliefs could still be strongly motivated to commit 
MCA. Therefore, the effect of moral beliefs prohibiting 
MCA is influenced or even dominated by offender 
motivation. This finding is consistent with Naso’s 
(2012) description of white-collar criminals: in contrast 
to antisocial offenders, white-collar criminals are 
“excessively self-centered … and willingly placing their 
personal goals ahead of moral standards” (p. 243). Such 
offenders may commit crimes when their financial 
security or lifestyle is threatened, especially when the 
probability of being detected is low.
 
1  f2 = [R2 (interaction model) - R2 (main effects model)] / [1-
R2 (main effects model)]. 
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Figure 3. Results of Testing Hypotheses in (a) Client, (b) Design, and (c) Financial 
scenarios (*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001) 
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Table 4. Results of the Structural Model Assessment 
Path 
Path Coefficient (p-value) 
Client Design Financial 
H1: Offender motivation → Intention 0.547 (0.000) 0.585 (0.000) 0.621 (0.000) 
H2: Target suitability → Intention 0.280 (0.002) 0.044 (0.531) 0.198 (0.029) 
H3: Capable guard. → Intention 0.025 (0.718) 0.179* (0.012) -0.122 (0.095) 
H4a: Moral beliefs*Offender motivation →Intention 0.174 (0.063) 0.166 (0.113) 0.227 (0.041) 
H4b: Moral beliefs*Target suitability → Intention -0.164 (0.065) 0.010 (0.907) -0.195 (0.102) 
H4c: Moral beliefs*Capable guard. → Intention -0.039 (0.527) -0.164 (0.053) -0.064 (0.439) 
H5a: Low self-control  → Offender motivation 0.676 (0.000) 0.575 (0.000) 0.626 (0.000) 
H5b: Low self-control  → Suitable target 0.344 (0.004) 0.030 (0.762) 0.138 (0.184) 
H6a: Hacking self-efficacy → Offender motivation -0.007 (0.949) 0.111 (0.254) 0.163 (0.031) 
H6b: Hacking self-efficacy → Target suitability 0.261 (0.014) 0.465 (0.000) 0.413 (0.000) 
H6c: Hacking self-efficacy → Capable guard. 0.131 (0.053) 0.052 (0.325) -0.035 (0.621) 
H7a: Deterrence → Target suitability -0.042 (0.622) -0.031 (0.724) 0.025 (0.830) 
H7b: Deterrence → Capable guard. 0.729 (0.000) 0.814 (0.000) 0.760 (0.000) 
Age → Intention 0.008 (0.908) -0.005 (0.926) -0.051 (0.523) 
Gender → Intention -0.063 (0.359) 0.109 (0.026) -0.073 (0.213) 
IS Security Exp. → Intention 0.109 (0.177) 0.070 (0.231) 0.041 (0.510) 
Employment → Intention -0.059 (0.407) -0.079 (0.231) -0.044 (0.502) 
         R2              Offender motivation 0.451 0.399 0.516 
                      Target suitability 0.303 0.234 0.245 
                      Capable guard. 0.538 0.658 0.577 
                      Intention 0.667 0.716 0.689 
Note: Coefficient with unexpected signs. Note: Bolded p-values are significant ( < 0.05). 
 
 
 
Figure 4. The Moderation Effect of Moral Beliefs on the Relationship Between 
Offender Motivation and MCA Intention in the Financial Data Scenario. 
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In addition, we found that low self-control increases 
offenders’ motivation in all three scenarios, whereas low 
self-control increases target suitability only in the client 
scenario. Hacking self-efficacy was found to increase 
offenders’ motivation only in the finance scenario but 
consistently exerted a positive impact on target 
suitability. Deterrence significantly increased capable 
guardianship but had no influence on target suitability. 
The implications and potential explanations of 
differences in hypotheses across the scenarios are 
provided in the discussion section.  
To summarize, some of the key findings from 
hypothesis testing are: 
• Among the three core constructs of RAT, offender 
motivation is the dominant driver for MCA across 
all scenarios. Target suitability plays a less 
important role and is significant in only two of the 
scenarios. Capable guardianship has no significant 
effect in reducing MCA intention.  
• Moral beliefs exhibit a small moderation effect in 
the financial scenario only and we found that its 
effect could be overridden by high offender 
motivation.  
• With respect to the antecedents of core RAT 
concepts, low self-control is the major driver for 
offender motivation. Hacking self-efficacy has a 
consistent and strong impact on the assessment of 
target suitability. Deterrence is the dominant 
factor influencing capable guardianship.  
5.4 Robustness Testing and Alternative 
Models 
In order to check the direct effects of the exogenous 
variables without the mediation of the RAT core 
constructs, we tested an alternative model consisting of 
low self-control, hacking self-efficacy, deterrence, 
moral belief, and control variables only. The model 
explained only 46.7% to 59.7% of the variance in MCA 
intention, compared with 67% to 72% in the full model. 
Low self-control and moral beliefs were significant at 
0.05 level while hacking self-efficacy and deterrence 
had no significant direct impact across all scenarios. 
Internet security experience was significant only in the 
client scenario. This result highlights the critical roles of 
the RAT core constructs in explaining MCA for our data 
sample. We further compared the R2 of our full model 
for explaining MCA intention with the R2s of other 
models seeking to explain IS misuse intention in prior 
studies, such as D’Arcy et al (2009) (R2 = 0.30), Siponen 
and Vance (2010) (R2 = 0.47), and Hu et al. (2011) (R2 
= 0.34). The full model of our study based on RAT has 
the highest R2 or predictive power of any of these 
models, further supporting the validity and power of 
RAT in explaining MCA.  
Our results show that the RAT core constructs play 
different mediating roles for the three antecedents. To 
further explore this, we applied the Shrout and Bolger’s 
(2002) bootstrapping method to test the mediation 
effect, as it has stronger statistical power than the 
traditional methods proposed by Baron and Kenny 
(1986) and Sobel (1982). To test mediation, we 
evaluated three paths: (1) the path from an antecedent, 
such as low self-control, to its mediating variables in 
RAT core constructs (Path A); (2) the path from the 
mediating variable to MCA intention (Path B); and (3) 
the direct path from the antecedent to MCA intention 
(Path C, or Path C’ when tested simultaneously with the 
indirect paths involving Paths A and B). Five thousand 
bootstrap samples were generated in SmartPLS. The 
indirect effects were computed for each sample by 
multiplying the coefficients of Paths A and B. The 95% 
bootstrap percentile intervals could then be constructed 
for both indirect and direct effects (i.e., coefficient of 
Path C’).  
The existence of indirect and direct effects is tested by 
checking whether the interval contains zero. If the 
interval does not contain zero, it means that the effect is 
nonzero. Full mediation is suggested when the direct 
effect is zero but the indirect effect is nonzero. Partial 
mediation occurs when both the direct and indirect 
effects are nonzero. Table 5 shows the mediation testing 
results. Overall, the RAT core constructs mediate some 
of the effects of low self-control while fully mediating 
the effect of hacking self-efficacy. Deterrence basically 
has a null effect on MCA intention. 
Considering the inconsistent impact of suitable target 
and capable guardianship across scenarios, we further 
performed a conjoint analysis (CA) of RAT core 
constructs on MCA intention to check the robustness of 
our findings. CA is a robust tool with high validity and 
reliability for investigating individual preferences, 
attitudes, and behaviors (Luo, Warkentin, & Li, 2015). 
CA is also flexible, which is applicable not only to 
product attributes in marketing literature but also to IS 
research investigating perceptions such as perceived 
security (Luo et al., 2015). In the conjoint analysis of this 
study, the dependent variable is the MCA intention. The 
independent variables are three dummy- coded 
attributes: offender motivation (2 levels: low, high), 
target suitability (2 levels: low, high), and capable 
guardianship (2 levels: low, high). For these three 
variables, a low level refers to values less than or equal 
to the mean, whereas a high level refers to values above 
the mean. Since the dependent variable has an interval 
scale in nature, ordinary least square (OLS) multiple 
regression was used to derive the part-worth utilities of 
all attribute levels and the statistical significance and 
relative importance (RI) of attributes. The relative 
importance of attribute i was computed using the 
following equation: 
Journal of the Association for Information Systems 
 
1568 
RIi = 
𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒃𝒖𝒕𝒆_𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚_𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒆𝒊
∑ 𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒃𝒖𝒕𝒆_𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚_𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒆𝒊
𝒏
𝒊=𝟏
 
The results of the conjoint analysis are shown in Table 
6. The significance level of the RAT core constructs is 
consistent across the three scenarios. Offender 
motivation and target suitability are statistically 
significant (p-value < 0.05) while capable guardianship 
is not (p-value > 0.05). The pattern of the relative 
importance also stays the same across scenarios, with 
offender motivation being the most important factor 
and target suitability as the second- most important 
factor. Overall, the findings from the conjoint analysis 
are robust across scenarios and support the dominant 
roles of offender motivation and suitable target 
identified in the PLS-SEM analysis. 
Table 5. Summary of Mediation Testing Results 
S
ce
n
a
ri
o
 
Antecedent Mediator  
Indirect effect (AB) Direct effect (C’) 
Mediation 
type 
2.5% 
lower 
bound 
97.5% 
upper 
bound 
Has 
zero? 
2.5% 
lower 
bound 
97.5% 
upper 
bound 
Has 
zero? 
C
li
en
t 
Low self-control Offender motivation 0.081 0.439 No 0.117 0.537 No Partial med. 
 Target suitability 0.028 0.212 No    Partial med. 
Hack self-efficacy Offender motivation -0.082 0.079 Yes -0.305 0.014 Yes No effect 
 Target suitability 0.014 0.178 No    Full med. 
 Capable guardianship -0.055 0.027 Yes    No effect 
Deterrrence Target suitability -0.078 0.040 Yes -0.143 0.356 Yes No effect 
 Capable guard. -0.204 0.164 Yes    No effect 
D
es
ig
n
 
Low self-control Offender motivation 0.208 0.516 No -0.13 0.211 No Partial med. 
 Target suitability -0.02 0.029 Yes    Only direct 
Hack self-efficacy Offender motivation -0.054 0.180 Yes -0.229 0.059 Yes No effect 
 Target suitability -0.028 0.117 Yes    No effect 
 Capable guardianship -0.011 0.030 Yes    No effect 
Deterrrence Target suitability -0.026 0.018 Yes -0.146 0.305 Yes No effect 
 Capable guardianship -0.115 0.264 Yes    No effect 
F
in
an
ce
 
Low self-control Offender motivation 0.068 0.492 No 0.04 0.519 No Partial med. 
 Target suitability -0.011 0.092 Yes    Only direct 
Hack self-efficacy Offender motivation 0.004 0.158 No -0.215 0.126 Yes Full med. 
 Target suitability 0.006 0.170 No    Full med. 
 Capable guardianship -0.015 0.036 Yes    No effect 
Deterrrence Target suitability -0.05 0.059 Yes -0.177 0.245 Yes No effect 
 Capable guardianship -0.252 0.081 Yes    No effect 
Table 6. Utilities, Statistical Significance and Relative Importance of Attributes 
Scenario Attribute Utility p-value RI Ranking 
Client Offender motivation Low (-2.182), High (2.182) < 0.001 72.3% 1 
Target suitability Low (-0.797), High (0.797) < 0.01 26.4% 2 
Capable guardianship Low (-0.037), High (0.037) > 0.05 1.2% 3 
Design Offender motivation Low (-2.963), High (2.963) < 0.001 79.0% 1 
Target suitability Low (-0.535), High (0.535) < 0.05 14.3% 2 
Capable guardianship Low (-0.252), High (0.252) > 0.05 6.7% 3 
Financial Offender motivation Low (-2.230), High (2.230) < 0.001 65.7% 1 
Target suitability Low (-0.747), High (0.747) < 0.01 22.0% 2 
Capable guardianship Low (0.417), High (-0.417) > 0.05 12.3% 3 
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To summarize, some of the key findings from the 
robustness tests and the comparison with alternative 
models are: 
• Our model built on RAT core constructs is 
stronger than the alternative research models for 
explaining MCA intention. 
• The RAT core constructs partially mediate the 
effect of low self-control while fully mediating 
the effect of hacking self-efficacy on MCA 
intention.  
• The RAT core constructs of offender motivation 
and target suitability are the dominant and most 
robust factors explaining MAC intention.  
5.5 Post Hoc Comparison of MCA 
Scenarios 
Despite the overall robustness of the RAT core 
constructs, we note the variation of the path modeling 
results across the three scenarios, suggesting the 
important influence of the MCA context. To increase 
the richness and practical relevance of our research 
findings, we further compared the means of all latent 
constructs using ANOVA analysis with Bonferroni 
tests and performed multigroup analysis (MGA) in 
SmartPLS to compare the difference in significant 
paths across the three scenarios.  
We found that three latent variables, i.e., moral beliefs, 
perceived extrinsic value, and intention, have 
significant differences in their means across scenarios 
in ANOVA. Interestingly, the research participants in 
the client scenario were found to have significantly 
lower moral beliefs prohibiting MCA than those in the 
design scenario and significantly higher intentions to 
commit MCA than in the other two scenarios. Low 
moral beliefs seem to be an important factor 
accounting for higher intentions to steal and sell client 
data. As expected, the research participants in the client 
scenario perceived less extrinsic monetary value than 
those in the financial data scenario. For MGA results 
reported in Appendix D, we focused on identifying 
significantly different path coefficients involving at 
least one significant path at the 0.05 level and found 
three such paths. The paths between target suitability 
and intention and between low self-control and target 
suitability in the client scenario have significantly 
higher coefficients than those in the product design 
scenario. The coefficients for the path from capable 
guardian to intention also exhibit significant 
differences between the design and finance scenarios 
with the former being positive and significant and the 
latter being nonsignificant. We further explore these 
significantly different path coefficients in detail in the 
discussion section.  
To summarize, some of the key findings from 
comparing the three MCA scenarios are: 
• The research participants appear to factor the 
type of digital target into their judgment of target 
suitability, personal moral beliefs prohibiting 
MCA, and their resulting MCA intentions.  
• The research participants in the client scenario 
appear to perceive lower monetary value, have 
lower moral beliefs prohibiting MCA, and higher 
intentions to commit MCA.  
• The links between low self-control and target 
suitability and between target suitability and 
MCA intentions are stronger in the client 
scenario than in the product design scenario.  
• Capable guardianship exhibits unexpected and 
unstable impacts on MCA intentions in different 
scenarios.  
6 Discussion 
Among the three core RAT constructs, we confirmed 
that offender motivation and target suitability are the 
primary drivers of employees’ intention to commit 
MCA in organizational settings. Employees are more 
likely to commit MCA when they do not think their 
acts are harmful and when they perceive digital assets 
to be valuable and suitable as targets (i.e., accessible, 
visible, and usable). Despite support for the effects of 
offender motivation and target suitability, capable 
guardianship was found to have a null effect in the 
client and financial data scenarios. This null effect of 
capable guardianship on reducing MCA may not be 
surprising given the strong relationship between 
deterrence and capable guardianship (H7b, p < 0.001), 
making most of the variance of capable guardianship 
attributable to deterrence. This is also consistent with 
the findings of Hu et al. (2011), which are based on a 
completely different theoretical model and dataset. Our 
findings, in conjunction with those of Hu et al. (2011), 
highlight at least one unique aspect of the MCA 
offenders as compared with those committing 
conventional crimes: neither deterrence nor 
guardianship are strong mechanisms for protecting 
digital assets from intentional and malicious insider 
attacks.  
At the same time, we found an unexpected significant 
positive effect of capable guardianship on MCA 
intentions in the product design scenario. An abnormal 
result such as this signals the potential effect of context 
(Johns, 2017), which prompted us to further examine 
the details of the situational scenarios presented in 
Appendix E. We submit that this unexpected positive 
impact may be related to how research participants 
interpret acceptable and authorized use of computer 
resources when answering survey questions measuring 
capable guardianship. The surrogate character in the 
product design scenario, i.e., Daniel, may have been 
perceived as having authorized access to the 
confidential design data because he is a senior engineer 
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(see Appendix E). Therefore, research participants 
assigned to the design scenario may not have 
considered the capable guardianship measures, i.e., 
security policy, SETA, and monitoring, to even be 
applicable to the behavior of Daniel, who supposedly 
sold the design data to a competitor. In a future study, 
it would be interesting to explore the impact of capable 
guardianship on insiders with authorized access after 
employees receive security training customized to the 
context of their specific job roles.  
Our results regarding the antecedents of the three core 
RAT constructs are mostly consistent with our 
hypotheses. Low self-control and hacking self-efficacy 
facilitate the formation of criminal motivation and 
favorable judgment about target suitability for MCA in 
organizations. As the relative magnitude of the path 
coefficients demonstrate, MCA motivation is largely 
driven by low self-control while target suitability is 
predominantly influenced by hacking self-efficacy or 
potential offenders’ knowledge, skill, and ability to use 
computing devices to access and steal confidential 
corporate data. These results clearly suggest that 
employees with low self-control are more motivated to 
commit MCA and those with high hacking self-
efficacy are more likely to deem a digital target as 
suitable. With respect to security guardianship, 
deterrence was found to significantly increase the 
perception of capable guardianship for the targeted 
digital assets.  
The path modeling results regarding the three 
antecedents show some variation in the impact of self-
control and hacking self-efficacy across scenarios, i.e., 
H5b (low self-control → target suitability) and H6a 
(hacking self-efficacy → offender motivation). 
Diverging from the client scenario, employees with 
relatively low self-control do not perceive product 
design data and financial data to be easier to 
compromise or a more suitable target. This may reflect 
the common awareness that key design information 
about a firm’s new products and financial data are 
classified as firm “top secrets” and are thus not 
particularly vulnerable to compromise, since doing so 
would require both insider knowledge and hacking 
skills. Therefore, potential employee offenders are 
rational decision makers who, although they may vary 
in self-control capability, consider the type of 
confidential data as part of their MCA decision- 
making processes.  
We also found that hacking self-efficacy (HSE) is only 
significant for increasing MCA motivation in the 
scenario involving financial data but not for the other 
two scenarios. Further comparison of the correlation of 
HSE and the two subdimensions of motivation, i.e., 
perceived extrinsic value (PEV) and perceived 
intrinsic value (PIV), suggests that HSE has a stronger 
correlation with PIV in the financial scenario but with 
PEV in the other two scenarios (see Appendix C). 
Employees may glean intrinsic value from either the 
outcome of hacking or from the process of hacking. 
The character described in the financial scenario, i.e., 
Deborah, is in financial distress. The primary outcome 
of hacking is to relieve the financial distress faced by 
Deborah, which is meant to generate monetary value, 
rather than producing intrinsic value, such as feelings 
of pride or excitement. In this case, the source of 
intrinsic value would be attributed more to the hacking 
process instead of the hacking outcome. Therefore, we 
submit that the effect of hacking self-efficacy may be 
stronger in situations involving higher PEV from the 
outcome of MCA. This result suggests that when 
examining MCA decisions, it is important to separate 
PEV and PIV and identify whether PIV is derived from 
the outcome of MCA or from the process of 
performing MCA.  
The MCA results based on the comparison of three 
situational scenarios (see Appendix D) provide further 
support for the important role of context in the 
decision-making process of potential offenders. The 
significant scenario differences in path coefficients for 
H2 (suitable target → intention) and H5b (low self-
control → suitable target) suggest that the calculative 
assessment of target suitability and low self-control 
seem to exert a bigger influence on the MCA decision 
in the client scenario than the design scenario in the 
context of confidential product design data being sold 
to a competing firm. From the result of the ANOVA 
analysis with Bonferroni tests, we also found the mean 
moral beliefs of the design scenario are significantly 
higher than that of the client scenario. Employees in 
the design scenario seem to be self-regulated more by 
moral beliefs and pay less attention to the suitability of 
the target when the MCA involves highly confidential 
data that could be used by competing firms to hurt their 
own organization.  
At the same time, we suspect that the nonsignificant 
effects of target suitability in the design scenario may 
also result from the competing influence of MCA 
motivation. To test the competing effect, we built an 
alternative model by dropping the path from MCA 
motivation. The path between target suitability and 
intention became significant at the 0.05 level in the 
design scenario. Selling confidential product design to 
a competitor could directly influence the 
competitiveness of the firm for which the potential 
offender works, which may introduce additional moral 
dilemmas or variations in MCA motivation, i.e., the 
assessment of value and harmfulness of the MCA. This 
would increase the relative impact of MCA motivation 
on intention, thereby decreasing the amount of unique 
variance that could be explained by target suitability. 
Therefore, we submit that target suitability plays a less 
important role in situations involving highly 
confidential data and serious moral issues. This result 
suggests that it is critical to take into account the type 
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of data and the third-party agency to which the 
confidential data is disclosed when examining an 
offender’s security behavior. 
Overall, the findings of our study support the following 
key points: 
• The three core pillars of RAT are not equally 
important to MCA in organizational settings; 
offender motivation and target suitability are the 
dominant and most robust factors influencing 
MCA decisions.  
• With respect to antecedents of the RAT core 
constructs, we found low self-control, hack self-
efficacy, and deterrence to be the dominant 
drivers for offender motivation, target suitability, 
and capable guardianship, respectively.  
• By comparing results across the three scenarios, 
we note the potential effect of various contextual 
features, such as type of digital asset, motivation 
for data breach by potential offenders, recipients 
of the stolen confidential data, etc. 
• When examining employee intention to commit 
malicious acts, it is important to consider not 
only situational opportunities but also employee 
motivations. This is because personal moral 
beliefs and target suitability become less 
important among strongly motivated offenders.  
• Perceived capable guardianship mostly has a null 
effect on MCA intention, but may exert an 
unexpected impact for potential offenders with 
authorized access to confidential digital assets. 
Further research is needed to gain a better 
understanding of this core RAT construct in the 
MCA context.  
6.1 Contribution to Theory 
The findings of this study have several important 
contributions to research on organizational information 
security. First, as one of the early inquires based on 
RAT in information security research, this study 
contributes to the literature by offering new insights, 
via the crucial lens of offender motivation, target 
suitability, and capable security guardianship, on MCA 
in an organizational context. Two of the central 
arguments of RAT, namely offender motivation and 
target suitability, are found to significantly influence 
an employee’s intention to commit MCA in 
organizational settings. On the other hand, capable 
security guardianship mostly has a null or weak effect 
on MCA intention, which echoes the results of many 
empirical studies regarding the effect of deterrence in 
online as well as offline settings (D’Arcy & Herath, 
2011; Hu et al., 2011; Paternoster, 1987). The 
conventional security guardianship enforced by 
organizations does not seem to be effective in 
preventing insiders from committing MCA. Future 
studies are needed to explore ways to design and 
deploy guardianship of an organization and to identify 
conditions under which guardianship can be effective. 
It would be interesting to expand security guardianship 
to measures taken by law enforcement agencies. As 
MCA by employees violates not only organizational 
policies but potentially federal and state laws as well, 
internal guardianship measures may take effect 
together with or even depend on the awareness of 
external guardianship measures by law enforcement 
agencies. 
RAT assumes offender motivation without explicitly 
identifying the motivational sources. As a result, prior 
empirical studies based on RAT have largely assumed 
offender motivation as a given condition and only 
tested the effect of target suitability and security 
guardianship. Our study is the first that explicitly 
operationalizes offender motivation and tests it 
together with the other two tenets of RAT. In 
particular, we operationalized it as a second-order 
construct formed by intrinsic and extrinsic values and 
lack of harmfulness. These findings shed new light on 
the critical role of offender motivation among the three 
tenets of RAT.  
Besides testing the core elements of RAT, our study 
further extends RAT by examining the interaction 
effects with moral beliefs, one of the frequently used 
constructs in criminology and information security 
research. We find that moral beliefs interact with MCA 
motivation such that moral beliefs significantly reduce 
MCA intention only when the level of MCA 
motivation is low. The effect of moral beliefs is 
contingent upon the strength of MCA motivation. 
Future studies are needed to further examine the effect 
of moral beliefs on the motivation underlying criminal 
acts. Also, it would be interesting to explore other 
potential constructs that may moderate the effect of 
core constructs in RAT such as employee risk 
propensity.  
Another contribution of this study is the development 
and operationalization of target suitability in the 
context of digital assets in an organization. Until now, 
prior studies applying RAT have only operationalized 
and empirically tested the subdimensions or properties 
of target suitability in offline settings (Cohen & Felson, 
1979; Felson, 1998). Given the few RAT-based studies 
in the digital context and the unique characteristics of 
digital assets, our study provides a valuable foundation 
for future studies to replicate and improve perceived 
accessibility, perceived visibility, and perceived 
usability as defining dimensions of target suitability in 
the context of digital assets. 
Our results also suggest that various contextual factors 
may factor into employees’ MCA decisions. For 
example, in contrast to outside offenders, internal 
offenders are also organizational employees. Their 
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MCA intentions may be influenced by their 
relationship with their organization. As suggested by 
the comparison of the three scenarios, employees seem 
to evaluate the nature of digital assets and potential 
victims in their MCA decisions, as lack of harmfulness 
influences MCA motivation only for the client scenario 
but not for the other two scenarios. When situations 
entail clear harms to employees’ own organizations, 
such as stealing design data for competitors, 
employees appear to rely more on intrinsic value for 
motivation and to be more constrained by their inherent 
moral beliefs when considering committing MCA. 
Future studies are needed to explicitly identify and test 
the effects of contextual organizational factors for 
MCA, such as the level of confidentiality of the 
targeted digital assets, the extent of harm, and the 
relationship between the offender and victim, among 
others. 
6.2 Implications for Practice 
The findings of this study have important practical 
implications for reducing and preventing MCA in 
organizations. We contend that not all three areas 
identified by RAT have the same effect on effectively 
managing information security threats from internal 
employees. According to our theoretical model built on 
RAT, organizations could focus their security efforts 
on eliminating one or two of the key elements in order 
to significantly reduce internal MCA. The challenge to 
organizations, however, is to determine which of the 
three elements they can effectively eliminate or 
significantly diminish. The results of our study shed 
some light on this critical issue and provide certain 
prescriptive directions.  
Given the finding that offender motivation is the most 
significant driver of MCA intention in all three 
scenarios and has the highest magnitude among the 
three drivers in RAT, minimization of this factor 
should be the top priority for organizations. Since our 
results suggest that low self-control and hacking self-
efficacy are the two most important factors influencing 
employees’ MCA motivation, it makes sense for 
organizations to screen candidates for certain 
organizational positions that have custodial 
responsibilities for valuable digital assets, such as 
database administrator, network manager, and network 
technician. This is consistent with the 
recommendations of Hu et al. (2011) and Hu et al. 
(2015), albeit from a different theoretical perspective. 
In comparison to offline crimes, employers may pay 
more attention to the impulsivity, risk-seeking, self-
centeredness and hacking self-efficacy characteristics 
of employees when hiring and training them for jobs 
with potential access to digital organizational assets. 
The three dimensions of digital target suitability, i.e., 
visibility, accessibility, and usability, are all found to 
have significant weights, suggesting a number of 
technical options for organizations to improve their 
defenses against insider security threats. While 
organizations, in general, cannot escape from the 
activities that generate, collect, process, and store 
valuable digital assets, they can certainly reduce the 
visibility, accessibility, and usability of these digital 
assets by deploying technologies such as data 
encryption, server virtualization, and a combination of 
different information security protection technologies. 
While none of these technologies are foolproof, 
together these technologies can help reduce the 
visibility of data, make it more difficult to gain 
unauthorized access, and diminish the usability of the 
data in cases of illegal or unauthorized acquisition.  
The mixed findings regarding the role of capable 
security guardianship in the formation of employee 
intentions to commit MCA also have some significant 
practical implications. Although our results show that 
perceived security guardianship, in general, does not 
have a strong negative impact on MCA intentions, the 
data do indicate that strong perceived guardianship has 
a marginal deterrence effect (p-value < 0.1) on the 
intention to commit MCA in the financial data 
scenario. While more studies are clearly needed on the 
role of security guardianship, organizations cannot 
afford to ignore the significance of having strong 
deterrence policies and information security education 
and awareness training programs (SETA). 
6.3 Limitations  
Like most theory-based empirical studies, our study 
inevitably has some limitations, which also provide 
opportunities for future research. One major limitation 
is related to the scenario-based cross-sectional design 
used in our study, meaning that all variables are 
measured at one point in time, which limits our ability 
to confirmatively establish causal relationships. For 
example, the cross-sectional design has no way to 
unravel how deterrence and capable guardianship are 
causally linked, i.e., whether deterrence shapes 
perceived guardianship or vice versa. The cross-
sectional design also increases concerns about 
common method variance (CMV), which increases the 
likelihood of inflated relationships among latent 
constructs (Podsakoff et al., 2003). To mitigate the 
issues of cross-sectional survey design, information 
security researchers should ideally resort to 
longitudinal design and/or different data sources to 
gauge independent and dependent variables. But the 
challenge of conducting such studies remains 
formidable in the context of MCA because of 
employees’ reluctance to report their own MCAs and 
the difficulty of directly observing MCAs by 
managers. Longitudinal design is particularly 
vulnerable to the bias of social desirability for self-
reported security behaviors (D’Arcy & Lowry, 2019).  
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To address the practical difficulties of examining 
MCAs in the digital world, information security 
researchers may: (1) explore activity logs generated by 
monitoring devices such as eye and mouse movement 
trackers to gauge employee security behaviors, and/or 
(2) conduct controlled experiments and use scenarios 
to explicitly manipulate salient variables and measure 
employee perceptions and projected behaviors. Recent 
advances in cognitive neural sciences also provide new 
ways to directly measure individuals’ brain activities 
during cognitive decision-making (Hu et al., 2015), 
which could serve as a separate data source that could 
be combined with behavioral survey data to test MCA 
research models.  
Second, because we only considered three typical 
MCA scenarios, we need to exercise caution in 
generalizing the findings to other MCA situations, as 
already demonstrated by the different test results from 
the three subsamples in relation to the effect of security 
guardianship on employee intention to commit MCA 
and other variations. The design of consistent and 
reliable scenarios with representative security threat 
cases remains a significant challenge for information 
security research. The third limitation is the concern 
about the use of behavioral intention instead of actual 
behavior as the dependent variable. This has been a 
common issue shared by most behavioral studies in the 
IS literature. The nature of criminality of the focal 
behavior has made measuring or collecting data on 
actual MCA behavior extremely difficult. Like 
criminologists, IS security scholars (e.g., D’Arcy et al. 
2009; Siponen & Vance, 2010; Hu et al., 2011; 
Johnston et al., 2015) have adopted the notion that 
intention should be considered indicative of an actual 
behavioral act (Osgood, 1997). As such, we believe 
that the intention to commit MCA is a functional proxy 
of actual behavior, albeit an imperfect one.  
Future research could leverage the theoretical 
framework established in this study and further explore 
innovative methodological approaches to collect other 
sources of data which may be used to infer actual 
behavior (e.g., system logs or sensory data collected by 
human interface devices such as keyboards and touch 
screens). Wang, Gupta, and Rao (2015) have 
demonstrated how survey data and system log data can 
be combined to provide more reliable and robust tests 
of theory-driven empirical models in organizational 
information security settings. 
7 Conclusion 
Insider security threats continue to pose a potentially 
devastating risk to organizational survival and 
competitiveness because they are difficult to detect, 
prevent, and mitigate in the increasingly connected 
digital world. To advance the line of research that 
focuses on deliberate malicious acts by employees and 
to operationalize and measure salient individual, 
system, and organizational factors, we draw on and 
extend the widely used routine activity theory (RAT) 
to understand deliberate MCA committed by 
employees towards organizational digital assets. 
Guided by the theory and tested with data from 
subjects holding a wide range of organizational 
positions, the proposed research model enhances our 
understanding of insider security threats by 
synthesizing the criminological aspects of the offender, 
the target, and guardianship with the individual 
characteristics of self-control, hacking self-efficacy, 
and moral beliefs, as well as organizational aspects of 
deterrence. This highly contextualized and relatively 
comprehensive theoretical model of insider MCA 
behavior advances the literature on organizational 
information security and individual decision-making. 
The empirical findings of this study also help 
organizations formulate better information security 
policies and management programs for managing 
insider security threats and thus improve the overall 
organizational information security posture. 
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Appendix A. Summary of Literature on Information Security Behaviors of 
Organizational Insiders 
Table A1. Summary of Literature on the Information Security Behaviors of Organizational Insiders 
Paper Method 
Main 
Theory/lenses IS behaviors (with 
malicious intent?) 
 
Study compromise of digital assets? (intentional 
compromise? identify specific digital target to 
compromise?) 
 Three pillars of RAT 
MOV STG CGS 
Holistic 
RAT 
Straub 
(1990) 
Survey/ 
cross-sectional  
General 
deterrence 
theory 
Computer abuse 
(No, study computer 
abuse in general) 
Yes (Yes, No) 
Examine computer 
abuse in general 
Yes No Yes No 
Boss et al. 
(2009) 
Survey/ 
cross-sectional  
Organizational 
control lens 
Information security 
precaution-taking 
behavior (No) 
No (No, No), 
Examine favorable 
security behaviors 
No No Yes No 
Bulgurcu et 
al. (2010) 
Survey/ 
cross-sectional  
Theory of 
planned 
behavior, 
Rational choice 
theory 
Information security 
awareness and ISP 
compliance (No) 
No (No, No) 
Examine 
compliance in 
general. 
No No Yes No 
D’Arcy et al. 
(2009) 
Survey/ 
scenario/ 
cross-sectional 
General 
deterrence 
theory 
IS misuse intention 
(No) 
Yes (Yes, Yes) 
Mention specific 
targets in the 
scenarios. 
No No Yes No 
D'Arcy and 
Devaraj 
(2012) 
Survey/ 
scenario/ 
cross-sectional 
General 
deterrence 
theory 
Technology misuse 
intentions (No) 
Yes (Yes, Yes) 
Mention specific 
targets in the 
scenarios.  
No No Yes No 
D'Arcy, 
Herath, & 
Shoss 
(2014) 
Survey/ 
scenario/ 
cross-sectional 
Coping theory, 
moral 
disengagement 
theory, social 
cognitive theory 
ISP violation (No) Yes (Yes, Yes) 
Mention specific 
targets in the 
scenarios. 
Yes No Yes No 
D'Arcy & 
Lowry 
(2019) 
Experience 
sampling 
methodology/ 
longitudinal 
for within-
subject 
variables.  
Rational choice 
theory, theory of 
planned 
behavior 
ISP compliance (No) No (No, No) No No Yes No 
Guo et al. 
(2011) 
Survey/ 
scenario/ 
cross-sectional 
Theory of 
reasoned action, 
theory of 
planned behavior  
ISP violation (No) Yes (Yes, Yes) 
Mention specific 
targets in the 
scenarios. 
Yes No Yes No 
Hu et al. 
(2012) 
Survey/ 
Cross-
sectional  
Theory of 
planned behavior 
ISP compliance (No) No (No, No) 
Examine 
compliance in 
general. 
No No No No 
Hsu et al. 
(2015) 
Survey/ 
Paired 
manager and 
employee data  
Social control 
theory  
Information security 
behaviors for 
benefiting 
organizations (No) 
No (No, No), 
Examine favorable 
security behaviors 
No No Yes No 
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Johnston et 
al. (2015) 
Survey/ 
Cross-
sectional 
Fear appeal 
theory and 
deterrence 
theory 
ISP compliance (No) No (No, No) 
Examine 
compliance in 
general. 
No No Yes No 
Lee & Lee 
(2002) 
Conceptual 
model 
Theory of 
planned 
behavior, social 
bound theory, 
social learning 
theory 
Computer abuse 
(No, study computer 
abuse in general) 
Yes (Yes, No) 
Examine computer 
abuse in general 
No No Yes No 
Posey, 
Bennett, & 
Roberts 
(2011) 
Survey/ 
Projective 
technique/ 
Cross-
sectional 
Causal reasoning 
theory 
Projected behaviors 
by co-workers 
(Yes, some projected 
behaviors are 
malicious) 
Yes (Yes, Yes) 
Describe targets in 
the projected 
behaviors of peers. 
No No No No 
Siponen & 
Vance 
(2010) 
Survey/ 
Scenario/ 
Cross-
sectional 
Neutralization 
theory, 
deterrence 
theory 
ISP violation (No, 
for the purpose of 
getting job done and 
helping others) 
Yes (Yes, Yes) 
Mention specific 
targets in the 
scenarios. 
Yes No Yes No 
Warkentin & 
Willison 
(2009) 
Editorial 
comments  
NA Insider threat to IS 
security (No, general 
review of insider 
threats) 
General review of 
issues related to 
insider threats. 
Yes No Yes No 
Willison & 
Siponen 
(2009) 
Research 
commentary 
NA Insider computer 
crime (Yes) 
Yes (Yes, NA) 
Conceptual 
illustration  
No Yes Yes No 
Willison & 
Warkentin 
(2013) 
Research 
commentary 
Neutralization, 
organizational 
justice, 
deterrence 
Computer abuse 
(Yes) 
Yes (Yes, NA) 
Conceptual 
illustration 
Yes No Yes No 
Willison, 
Lowry, & 
Paternoster 
(2018) 
Research 
commentary 
Rational choice 
framework, 
deterrence 
theory 
Computer abuse 
(Yes) 
Yes (Yes, NA) 
Conceptual 
illustration 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Workman & 
Gathegi 
(2007) 
Field 
experiment 
Theory of 
planned 
behavior, social 
learning and 
deterrence 
theories  
ISP Violation 
behaviors (No, study 
violation in general) 
Yes (Yes, Partial )  
Mostly general 
violations such as 
“a security 
measure”. 
Yes No Yes No 
Yar (2005) Research 
commentary 
Routine activity 
theory 
Cybercrime (Yes) Yes (Yes, NA) 
Conceptual 
illustration of RAT 
in cyberspace. 
Assume given 
motivation.  
No Yes Yes No 
Leukfeldt & 
Yar (2016) 
Secondary 
analysis on an 
archived 
dataset by 
Domenie et al. 
Domenie et al. 
(2013) 
Routine activity 
theory 
Victimization of 
cybercrime (Yes, but 
study from the 
perspective of 
victims of 
cybercrime instead 
of offenders) 
Yes (Yes, No) 
Consider human 
subjects as the 
target to be 
victimized by 
cybercrimes such 
as cyberstalking 
and identity theft.  
No Yes Yes No 
Note: MOV – Offender motivation of compromising digital assets, STG – Target suitability, CGS – Capable guardianship of digital assets. 
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Appendix B. Survey Instrument 
Table B1. Section 1: Perceived Accessibility, Usability, and Visibility 
Perceived accessibility (PAC) 
PAC1 
 
I would think that the confidential data of my company are readily accessible to me.  
(1-strongly disagree, 4-not sure either way, 7-strongly agree) 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
PAC2 
 
I would feel that I could access the confidential data of my company anytime I want to.  
(1-strongly disagree, 4-not sure either way, 7-strongly agree) 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
PAC3 
 
I would believe that the confidential data of my company are easy to access by people 
like me. 
(1-strongly disagree, 4-not sure either way, 7-strongly agree)  
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
Perceived usability (Inertia) (PUS) 
PUS1 
 
I would think that the confidential data could be usable to me without much effort  
(1-strongly disagree, 4-not sure either way, 7-strongly agree) 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
PUS2 
 
I would feel that the confidential data could be used right away  
(1-strongly disagree, 4-not sure either way, 7-strongly agree) 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
PUS3 
 
I would believe that I could use the confidential data without difficulty  
(1-strongly disagree, 4-not sure either way, 7-strongly agree) 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
Perceived visibility (PVS) 
PVS1 
 
I would know where specific types of confidential data are stored  
(1-strongly disagree, 4-not sure either way, 7-strongly agree) 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
PVS2 
 
I would be able to locate specific types of confidential data  
(1-strongly disagree, 4-not sure either way, 7-strongly agree) 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
PVS3 
 
I would be aware of the storing location of specific types of confidential data  
(1-strongly disagree, 4-not sure either way, 7-strongly agree). 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
Table B2. Section 2: Intention and Moral Beliefs 
INT1 
 
I would have made the same decision if I were in the same situation  
(1-strongly disagree, 4-not sure either way, 7-strongly agree) 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
INT2 
 
I could see myself making the same decision if I were in the same situation.  
(1-strongly disagree, 4-not sure either way, 7-strongly agree) 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
RC 
 
How realistic do you think this scenario is in your own company? 
(1=highly unrealistic, 4- not sure either way, 7=highly realistic)  
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
MRB1 I would find it morally unacceptable to do what the character did if I were in that situation 
(1-strongly disagree, 4-not sure either way, 7-strongly agree) 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
MRB2 
 
It would be against my moral beliefs to do what the character did if I were in the same 
situation. (1-strongly disagree, 4-not sure either way, 7-strongly agree) 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
Table B3. Section 3: Perceived Value 
If you committed the act described in the scenarios, it is likely that:  
1-Strongly Disagree                                                     4-Neutral                                                                  7-Strongly Agree 
PEV1 you would be able to have more material possessions  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
PEV2 you would have more money than you ever had before 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
PEV3 you would be able to afford things you could not afford 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
PEV4 you would be able to buy things you have always wanted to buy 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
PIV1 you would feel proud  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
PIV2 you would feel thrilled 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
PIV3 you would feel happy 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
PIV4 you would feel satisfied 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
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Table B4. Section 4: Individual Propensity (Low Self-Control) 
1-Strongly Disagree                                                     4-Neutral                                                                  7-Strongly Agree 
IMP1 I often act on the spur of the moment without stopping to think.  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
IMP2 I don’t devote much thought and effort to preparing for the future. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
IMP3 I often do whatever brings me pleasure here and now, even at the cost of some distant 
goal. 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
IMP4 I'm more concerned with what happens to me in the short run than in the long run. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
RSK1 I like to test myself every now and then by doing something a little risky. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
RSK2 Sometimes I will take a risk just for the fun of it. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
RSK3 I sometimes find it exciting to do things for which I might get in trouble. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
RSK4 Excitement and adventure are more important to me than security. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
SCT1 I try to look out for myself first, even if it means making things difficult for other people. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
SCT2 I have little sympathy for other people when they are having problems 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
SCT3 If things I do upset people, it’s their problem not mine. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
SCT4 I will try to get the things I want even when I know it’s causing problems for other 
people.  
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
TMP1 I lose my temper pretty easily. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
TMP2  Often, when I am angry at people, I feel more like hurting them than talking to them 
about why I am angry.   
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
TMP3 When I am really angry, other people had better stay away from me. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
TMP4  When I have a serious disagreement with someone, it is usually hard for me to talk calmly 
about it without getting upset.   
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
Table B5. Section 5: Hacking Self-Efficacy  
1-Strongly Disagree                                                     4-Neutral                                                                  7-Strongly Agree 
HSE1 
 
If I wanted to, I would be able to use my computer skills to gain unauthorized access to 
and obtain sensitive corporate information from my organization 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
HSE2 
 
If I wanted to, I am confident I could get sensitive corporate information from my 
organization without authorization by using my computer skills 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
HSE3 
 
If I wanted to, I believe I have the necessary computer skills to gain unauthorized access 
to and obtain sensitive corporate information from my organization. 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
Table B6. Section 6: Perceived Harmfulness  
1-Strongly Disagree                                                     4-Neutral                                                                  7-Strongly Agree 
LHM1 
 
I think it would be harmful to do what the character described above decided to do if I 
were in the same situation. 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
LHM2 
 
I believe it would be damaging to do what the character described above decided to do if 
I were in the same situation. 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
Table B7. Section 7: Deterrence Measures (Certainty, Severity, Celerity) 
1-Strongly Disagree                                                     4-Neutral                                                                  7-Strongly Agree 
CER1 It is routine for our company to review audit logs to identify computer abusive activities 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
CER2 It is certain that employees who commit computer abusive activities will be caught. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
CER3 It is likely that computer abusive activities can be traced back to the violators.  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
SVR1 In our company, employees who are caught abusing computers and data are severely 
punished. 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
SVR2 In our company, employees who are caught abusing computers and data are critically 
reprimanded. 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
SVR3 In our company, employees who are caught abusing computers and data face serious 
consequences. 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
CEL1 In our company, the actions against employee computer abusive behavior are immediate. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
CEL2 In our company, the actions against employee computer abusive behavior are 
instantaneous. 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
CEL3 In our company, the actions against employee computer abusive behavior are timely. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
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Table B8. Section 8: Security Guardianship  
1-Strongly Disagree                                                     4-Neutral                                                                  7-Strongly Agree 
POL1 My company has specific guidelines that describe acceptable use of computing 
resources such as email and the internet 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
POL2 My company has established rules of behavior for use of computer resources. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
POL3 My company has a formal policy that forbids employees from accessing computer 
systems that they are not authorized to use. 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
POL4 My company has specific guidelines that describe acceptable computer passwords and 
enforces regularly changing them. 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
POL5 My company has specific guidelines that govern what employees are allowed to do with 
their computers. 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
SETA1 In my company, employees are briefed on the consequences of modifying computerized 
data in an unauthorized way. 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
SETA2 My organization educates employees on their computer and information security 
responsibilities. 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
SETA3 In my company, employees are briefed on the consequences of accessing computer 
systems that they are not authorized to use. 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
MOR1 My company monitors any modification or altering of computerized data by employees. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
MOR2 Employee computing activities are monitored by my organization. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
Table B9. Section 9: Respondent Profile (Choose One) 
Age 
 
• < 24 
• 25-34 
• 35-44 
• 45-55 
• > 55 
Education 
 
• High school 
• Professional School 
• College  
• Graduate College 
• Other 
 Sex • Male (1) 
• Female (0) 
Employment status  • Part Time  
• Full Time 
Job Position 
 
• Corporate executive 
• Division manager/supervisor 
• IT Professional 
• Administrative staff 
• Business/professional  
• Technical/engineering  
• Other (please specify) 
Computer usage 
(hours per day) 
• < 2 
• 2-3 
• 4-5 
• 6-8 
• > 8 
Internet Experience 
(Approximately 
how many years 
have you been 
using the Internet?) 
• <5 years 
•  6-10 years  
• 11-15 years  
• 16-20 
• >20 years 
Computer access 
(choose one only) 
• Perform data entry only 
• Run applications and generate 
reports 
• Access to database and date 
file  
• Add and modify data in the 
system 
• Install new programs and add 
new users 
Prior Criminal 
Offense  
 
Have you committed computer and 
information security violations before? 
• Yes 
• No 
The number of 
employees in your 
company is 
• 1-100 
• 101-250 
• 251-500 
• 501-1,000 
• 1,001-5,000 
• 5,000+ 
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The industry your 
company primarily 
belongs to: 
 
• Manufacturing 
• Financial (bank, insurance, etc.)  
• Services (healthcare, hospitality, 
etc.) 
• Agriculture 
• Information Technology 
• Retail/wholesale 
• Education 
• Transportation/logistics  
• Utility/Energy 
• Other (Specify)___________ 
IS security 
experience: How 
much do you know 
about the concept, 
technology, and 
practice related to 
information security 
in organizations? 
• 1 – I know very little about it 
• 2 – I heard about it   
• 3 – I had information security 
training in school or from my 
company 
• 4 – I deal with information 
security issues in my routine 
work  
• 5 - I am an expert in 
information security  
• 6 - I manage information 
security for my company 
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Appendix C. Results of Measurement Model Testing 
Table C1. Results of Invariance Measurement Testing Using Permutation 
  Compostional Invariance Partial 
Measure. 
Invariance 
Equal Mean Assessment 
Full Measure. 
Invariance 
  Correlation 5% Quantile Difference Confidence Interval 
Equal   C vs. D C vs. F D vs. F C vs. D C vs. F D vs. F C vs. D C vs. F D vs. F C vs. D C vs. F D vs. F 
1. Moral beliefs 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.998 0.998 0.999 Yes -0.545 -0.276 0.273 (-0.257,0.249) (-0.267,0.268) (-0.255,0.257) No  
No 
2. Impulsivity 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 Yes 0.018 -0.011 -0.030 (-0.247,0.258) (-0.258,0.250) (-0.256,0.251) Yes 
3. Risk seeking 1.000 1.000 0.998 0.997 0.997 0.996 Yes 0.063 0.001 -0.059 (-0.250,0.257) (-0.264,0.267) (-0.263,0.255) Yes 
4. Self-centeredness 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.999 0.998 0.998 Yes 0.026 -0.023 -0.052 (-0.251,0.253) (-0.257,0.265) (-0.260,0.252) Yes 
5. Temper 1.000 0.997 0.999 0.997 0.996 0.998 Yes 0.107 -0.018 -0.117 (-0.249,0.244) (-0.257,0.267) (-0.260,0.258) Yes 
6. Hack self-efficacy 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 Yes 0.001 -0.090 -0.089 (-0.251,0.241) (-0.265,0.253) (-0.268,0.263) Yes 
7. Certainty 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 Yes 0.063 0.050 -0.015 (-0.250,0.246) (-0.261,0.254) (-0.257,0.260) Yes 
8. Severity 0.972 0.990 0.986 0.281 0.718 0.348 Yes 0.151 0.054 -0.024 (-0.256,0.251) (-0.252,0.258) (-0.258,0.262) Yes 
9. Celerity 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 Yes 0.179 0.078 -0.093 (-0.261,0.251) (-0.252,0.259) (-0.259,0.260) Yes 
10. Extrinsic value 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 Yes -0.199 -0.444 -0.262 (-0.255,0.250) (-0.268,0.267) (-0.253,0.263) No 
11. Intrinsic value 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 Yes 0.210 0.308 0.081 (-0.254,0.247) (-0.269,0.265) (-0.263,0.252) No 
12. Lack of harm. 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 Yes 0.237 0.238 -0.025 (-0.253,0.254) (-0.263,0.277) (-0.265,0.261) Yes 
13. Accessibility 1.000 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.997 Yes -0.028 0.055 0.084 (-0.253,0.255) (-0.246,0.268) (-0.261,0.254) Yes 
14. Visibility 1.000 1.000 0.999 0.998 0.999 0.994 Yes 0.024 -0.004 -0.029 (-0.250,0.247) (-0.266,0.271) (-0.260,0.256) Yes 
15. Usability 0.999 1.000 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 Yes 0.008 0.186 0.175 (-0.250,0.254) (-0.262,0.274) (-0.254,0.256) Yes 
16. Security policies 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 Yes 0.040 0.003 -0.039 (-0.261,0.259) (-0.257,0.256) (-0.259,0.259) Yes 
17. Monitoring 0.994 0.968 0.992 0.405 0.611 0.327 Yes 0.094 0.023 -0.035 (-0.248,0.257) (-0.265,0.252) (-0.248,0.258) Yes 
18. SETA 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 Yes 0.058 0.103 0.047 (-0.245,0.254) (-0.255,0.256) (-0.250,0.257) Yes 
19. Intention 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 Yes 0.326 0.349 0.013 (-0.241,0.254) (-0.262,0.263) (-0.247,0.251) No 
20. Low self-control 0.999 0.999 1.000 0.999 0.999 0.999 Yes 0.056 -0.029 -0.084 (-0.251,0.248) (-0.265,0.256) (-0.255,0.264) Yes 
21. Deterrence 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.998 0.997 0.999 Yes 0.130 0.068 -0.059 (-0.262,0.239) (-0.258,0.249) (-0.252,0.261) Yes 
22. Motivated offender 0.968 0.972 0.995 0.952 0.949 0.961 Yes 0.150 0.193 0.022 (-0.243,0.257) (-0.267,0.258) (-0.245,0.256) Yes 
23. Suitable target 0.999 0.999 0.998 0.999 0.998 0.997 Yes 0.000 0.104 0.099 (-0.250,0.245) (-0.261,0.261) (-0.252,0.250) Yes 
24. Capable guard. 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.999 0.999 0.999 Yes 0.057 0.049 -0.007 (-0.252,0.243) (-0.265,0.263) (-0.253,0.257) Yes 
Note: C = Client, D = Design, F = Finance. 
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Table C2. Weights, T-Statistics and P-Values of Formative Constructs 
Scenario 
Client Design Finance 
Weight t p Weight t p Weight t p 
Impulsivity -> Low self-control 0.316 17.586 0.000 0.279 15.184 0.000 0.259 11.579 0.000 
Risk seeking -> Low self-control 0.268 11.645 0.000 0.263 13.366 0.000 0.312 13.398 0.000 
Self-centeredness -> Low self-control 0.291 16.558 0.000 0.343 13.321 0.000 0.321 16.646 0.000 
Temper -> Low self-control 0.270 12.574 0.000 0.233 9.276 0.000 0.259 12.104 0.000 
Perceived certainty -> Deterrence 0.421 7.095 0.000 0.382 17.533 0.000 0.367 18.117 0.000 
Perceived severity -> Deterrence 0.393 15.678 0.000 0.368 22.834 0.000 0.381 21.828 0.000 
Perceived celerity -> Deterrence 0.342 13.823 0.000 0.349 22.846 0.000 0.350 20.733 0.000 
Perceived extrinsic value -> Offender motivation 0.375 3.393 0.001 0.216 2.254 0.024 0.180 2.180 0.029 
Perceived intrinsic value -> Offender motivation 0.619 5.518 0.000 0.861 11.359 0.000 0.869 11.584 0.000 
Lack of harmfulness -> Offender motivation 0.298 2.941 0.003 0.049 0.604 0.546 0.141 1.463 0.144 
Perceived accessibility -> Target suitability 0.412 17.797 0.000 0.364 13.890 0.000 0.402 11.720 0.000 
Perceived visibility -> Target suitability 0.300 14.242 0.000 0.334 11.498 0.000 0.273 5.731 0.000 
Perceived usability -> Target suitability 0.367 25.737 0.000 0.386 18.501 0.000 0.458 11.675 0.000 
Security policies -> Capable guard. 0.342 22.816 0.000 0.329 16.649 0.000 0.362 12.726 0.000 
Computer monitoring -> Capable guard. 0.366 19.038 0.000 0.391 21.448 0.000 0.381 19.841 0.000 
SETA -> capable guard. 0.352 32.129 0.000 0.373 23.457 0.000 0.361 14.998 0.000 
Note: Significant p-values are bolded. 
Table C3. Loadings, Average Variance Extracted (AVE) and Composite Reliability (CR) 
    Loading AVE CR 
Constructs Item Client Design Finance Client Design Finance Client Design Finance 
1. Moral beliefs MRB_1 0.976 0.962 0.976 0.939 0.922 0.950 0.969 0.959 0.974 
MRB_2 0.962 0.959 0.973             
2. Impulsivity IMP_1 0.880 0.772 0.839 0.771 0.733 0.711 0.931 0.916 0.908 
IMP_2 0.846 0.863 0.805             
IMP_3 0.915 0.906 0.872             
IMP_4 0.870 0.878 0.855             
3. Risk seeking RSK_1 0.851 0.858 0.863 0.779 0.783 0.769 0.934 0.935 0.930 
RSK_2 0.890 0.887 0.888             
RSK_3 0.900 0.906 0.916             
RSK_4 0.888 0.886 0.839             
4. Self-centeredness SCT_1 0.867 0.869 0.857 0.782 0.785 0.745 0.935 0.936 0.921 
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SCT_2 0.904 0.877 0.878             
SCT_3 0.860 0.890 0.855             
SCT_4 0.905 0.908 0.862             
5. Temper TMP_1 0.766 0.907 0.847 0.682 0.847 0.793 0.896 0.957 0.939 
TMP_2 0.861 0.944 0.915             
TMP_3 0.833 0.917 0.919             
TMP_4 0.841 0.912 0.879             
6. Hacking self-efficacy SE_1 0.961 0.961 0.972 0.934 0.946 0.949 0.977 0.981 0.982 
SE_2 0.977 0.984 0.981             
SE_3 0.962 0.973 0.969             
7. Perceived certainty CER_1 0.791 0.814 0.831 0.709 0.728 0.737 0.879 0.889 0.894 
CER_2 0.900 0.903 0.885             
8. Perceived severity SVR_1 0.875 0.974 0.956 0.861 0.887 0.900 0.949 0.959 0.964 
SVR_2 0.969 0.934 0.936             
SVR_3 0.938 0.916 0.954             
9. Perceived celerity CEL_1 0.912 0.923 0.950 0.813 0.830 0.871 0.929 0.936 0.953 
CEL_2 0.914 0.929 0.927             
CEL_3 0.878 0.880 0.923             
10. Perceived extrinsic value PEV_1 0.899 0.854 0.872 0.893 0.861 0.852 0.971 0.961 0.958 
PEV_2 0.965 0.948 0.924             
PEV_3 0.966 0.951 0.961             
PEV_4 0.948 0.955 0.934             
11. Perceived intrinsic value PIV_1 0.970 0.964 0.964 0.951 0.946 0.908 0.987 0.986 0.975 
PIV_2 0.984 0.969 0.928             
PIV_3 0.986 0.984 0.966             
PIV_4 0.962 0.973 0.953             
12. Lack of harmfulness LHM_1 0.958 0.975 0.910 0.927 0.938 0.862 0.962 0.968 0.926 
LHM_2 0.967 0.961 0.947             
13. Perceived accessibility PAC_1 0.945 0.940 0.891 0.888 0.869 0.855 0.960 0.952 0.947 
PAC_2 0.954 0.942 0.945             
PAC_3 0.928 0.914 0.937             
14. Perceived visibility PVS_1 0.961 0.932 0.926 0.933 0.886 0.888 0.977 0.959 0.960 
PVS_2 0.975 0.961 0.949             
PVS_3 0.962 0.931 0.952             
15. Perceived usability PUS_1 0.962 0.931 0.915 0.903 0.883 0.839 0.966 0.958 0.940 
PUS_2 0.951 0.934 0.929             
PUS_3 0.939 0.954 0.904             
16. Security policies POL_1 0.921 0.892 0.830 0.832 0.771 0.760 0.961 0.944 0.941 
POL_2 0.905 0.903 0.891             
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POL_3 0.909 0.860 0.883             
POL_4 0.890 0.840 0.899             
POL_5 0.934 0.894 0.854             
17. Computer monitoring MOR_1 0.939 0.963 0.980 0.930 0.926 0.868 0.964 0.962 0.929 
MOR_2 0.990 0.962 0.880             
18. SETA SETA_1 0.920 0.935 0.941 0.846 0.873 0.894 0.943 0.954 0.962 
SETA_2 0.904 0.918 0.951             
SETA_3 0.935 0.950 0.945             
19. Intention INT_1 0.986 0.982 0.978 0.972 0.963 0.957 0.986 0.981 0.978 
INT_2 0.986 0.980 0.978             
 
Table C4a. Mean, Standard Deviation, and Discriminant Validity (Client) 
  Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
1. Moral beliefs 5.04 1.63 0.97                                     
2. Impulsivity 3.28 1.53 -0.03 0.88                                   
3. Risk seeking 3.28 1.49 -0.03 0.72 0.88                                 
4. Self-centeredness 2.92 1.55 0.03 0.72 0.64 0.88                               
5. Temper 3.35 1.36 0.12 0.70 0.56 0.73 0.83                             
6. Hacking self-efficacy 3.43 1.93 -0.01 0.49 0.55 0.60 0.50 0.97                           
7. Perceived certainty 5.09 1.21 0.23 -0.01 0.18 -0.07 -0.08 0.00 0.84                         
8. Perceived severity 5.34 1.27 0.10 -0.20 0.00 -0.17 -0.15 -0.06 0.55 0.93                       
9. Perceived celerity 5.03 1.22 0.12 -0.12 0.10 -0.03 -0.08 -0.08 0.56 0.77 0.90                     
10. Perceived extrinsic value 3.79 1.66 0.17 0.58 0.46 0.46 0.50 0.42 0.07 -0.09 0.01 0.94                   
11. Perceived intrinsic value 3.14 1.81 -0.14 0.59 0.51 0.56 0.50 0.39 0.00 -0.07 0.07 0.61 0.98                 
12. Lack of harmfulness 2.49 1.38 -0.50 0.22 0.21 0.28 0.13 0.03 -0.35 -0.24 -0.14 0.00 0.29 0.96               
13. Perceived accessibility 3.91 1.80 0.07 0.53 0.37 0.46 0.45 0.44 -0.14 -0.12 -0.06 0.55 0.59 0.22 0.94             
14. Perceived visibility 4.45 1.69 0.15 0.36 0.41 0.32 0.37 0.45 -0.03 0.04 -0.02 0.43 0.35 0.12 0.67 0.97           
15. Perceived usability 3.93 1.71 0.08 0.43 0.38 0.40 0.39 0.44 -0.11 -0.05 -0.04 0.49 0.52 0.24 0.88 0.80 0.95         
16. Security policies 5.35 1.37 0.17 -0.05 0.08 0.00 -0.09 0.09 0.64 0.59 0.45 0.01 -0.02 -0.22 -0.01 0.05 0.04 0.91       
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17. Computer monitoring 4.98 1.56 0.12 -0.09 0.13 0.01 -0.03 0.11 0.65 0.62 0.54 0.03 0.06 -0.26 -0.11 -0.04 -0.06 0.83 0.96     
18. SETA 4.99 1.46 0.08 -0.03 0.11 0.08 -0.04 0.07 0.61 0.58 0.58 0.00 0.06 -0.14 -0.03 0.03 0.01 0.87 0.81 0.92   
19. Intention 3.37 1.89 -0.16 0.68 0.56 0.59 0.53 0.38 -0.07 -0.07 0.03 0.50 0.70 0.42 0.69 0.43 0.60 -0.03 -0.07 0.05 0.99 
Note: Diagonal numbers are the square root of the AVE values. Off-diagonal numbers are the correlations among latent constructs. 
Table C4b. Mean, Standard Deviation, and Discriminant Validity (Design) 
  Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
1. Moral belief 5.91 1.44 0.96                                     
2. Impulsivity 3.26 1.47 -0.29 0.86                                   
3. Risk seeking 3.17 1.50 -0.26 0.78 0.88                                 
4. Self-centeredness 2.88 1.53 -0.35 0.78 0.80 0.89                               
5. Temper 3.20 1.63 -0.27 0.62 0.66 0.72 0.92                             
6. Hacking self-efficacy 3.43 2.04 0.05 0.38 0.44 0.46 0.27 0.97                           
7. Perceived certainty 5.00 1.39 0.15 0.11 0.18 0.10 0.13 -0.02 0.85                         
8. Perceived severity 5.20 1.46 0.12 -0.06 -0.01 -0.08 0.04 -0.14 0.76 0.94                       
9. Perceived celerity 4.79 1.45 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.07 0.17 -0.10 0.65 0.81 0.91                     
10. Perceived extrinsic value 4.11 1.54 -0.06 0.35 0.38 0.42 0.32 0.45 -0.04 -0.09 0.01 0.93                   
11. Perceived intrinsic value 2.75 1.93 -0.40 0.55 0.49 0.65 0.48 0.31 0.04 -0.04 0.08 0.49 0.97                 
12. Lack of harmfulness 2.15 1.45 -0.43 0.10 0.05 0.14 0.07 -0.06 -0.05 -0.07 0.01 -0.06 0.32 0.97               
13. Perceived accessibility 3.95 1.88 -0.14 0.21 0.21 0.27 0.12 0.40 -0.12 -0.12 -0.06 0.40 0.40 0.14 0.93             
14. Perceived visibility 4.42 1.66 0.04 0.11 0.14 0.24 0.02 0.46 0.03 -0.04 -0.05 0.39 0.25 0.02 0.70 0.94           
15. Perceived usability 3.92 1.82 -0.13 0.21 0.25 0.30 0.11 0.47 -0.07 -0.09 0.00 0.39 0.38 0.07 0.84 0.78 0.94         
16. Security policies 5.29 1.31 0.26 -0.07 -0.06 -0.13 -0.03 -0.02 0.62 0.64 0.58 0.02 -0.10 -0.23 0.02 0.06 -0.01 0.88       
17. Computer monitoring 4.89 1.56 0.20 0.00 0.04 -0.03 0.01 -0.05 0.76 0.72 0.67 -0.01 -0.01 -0.07 -0.12 -0.01 -0.07 0.70 0.96     
18. SETA 4.91 1.47 0.19 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.71 0.66 0.67 0.02 0.00 -0.04 -0.13 -0.06 -0.09 0.71 0.84 0.93   
19. Intention 2.74 1.93 -0.48 0.48 0.46 0.56 0.43 0.20 0.14 0.04 0.18 0.45 0.78 0.34 0.37 0.23 0.33 -0.05 0.09 0.10 0.98 
Note: Diagonal numbers are the square root of the AVE values. Off-diagonal numbers are the correlations among latent constructs. 
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Table C4c. Mean, Standard Deviation, and Discriminant Validity (Finance) 
  Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
1. Moral beliefs 5.49 1.59 0.97                                     
2. Impulsivity 3.30 1.44 -0.20 0.84                                   
3. Risk seeking 3.32 1.55 -0.38 0.64 0.88                                 
4. Self-centeredness 2.96 1.42 -0.34 0.69 0.70 0.86                               
5. Temper 3.40 1.57 -0.23 0.68 0.62 0.70 0.89                             
6. Hacking self-efficacy 3.61 1.88 -0.19 0.45 0.33 0.43 0.45 0.97                           
7. Perceived certainty 5.03 1.26 0.16 -0.07 -0.03 0.03 0.03 0.08 0.86                         
8. Perceived severity 5.27 1.47 0.19 -0.26 -0.13 -0.14 -0.09 -0.02 0.72 0.95                       
9. Perceived celerity 4.92 1.49 0.03 -0.14 0.05 0.01 -0.02 0.05 0.67 0.84 0.93                     
10. Perceived extrinsic value 4.51 1.53 0.08 0.29 0.27 0.13 0.28 0.35 0.29 0.21 0.19 0.93                   
11. Perceived intrinsic value 2.60 1.70 -0.57 0.53 0.64 0.68 0.52 0.41 0.04 -0.09 0.12 0.16 0.95                 
12. Lack of harmfulness 2.19 1.14 -0.57 0.30 0.42 0.36 0.25 0.27 -0.30 -0.33 
-
0.17 0.02 0.58 0.93               
13. Perceived accessibility 3.79 1.73 -0.06 0.25 0.17 0.28 0.25 0.47 0.05 -0.06 
-
0.05 0.36 0.32 0.22 0.92             
14. Perceived visibility 4.46 1.49 -0.06 0.04 0.19 0.18 0.09 0.37 0.08 0.05 0.09 0.38 0.16 0.14 0.58 0.94           
15. Perceived usability 3.61 1.68 -0.23 0.27 0.38 0.38 0.34 0.42 0.08 -0.04 0.06 0.32 0.52 0.38 0.76 0.59 0.92         
16. Security policies 5.34 1.28 0.24 -0.19 -0.10 -0.21 -0.12 0.00 0.63 0.64 0.56 0.23 -0.13 
-
0.33 0.11 0.17 0.14 0.87       
17. Computer monitoring 4.94 1.50 0.11 -0.07 0.03 -0.12 -0.08 -0.04 0.65 0.67 0.64 0.30 0.04 
-
0.20 0.02 0.12 0.11 0.73 0.93     
18. SETA 4.83 1.61 0.16 -0.07 0.02 -0.04 -0.10 0.02 0.60 0.65 0.60 0.34 -0.01 
-
0.18 0.13 0.20 0.15 0.68 0.78 0.95   
19. Intention 2.72 1.81 -0.50 0.58 0.59 0.67 0.58 0.41 0.00 -0.18 
-
0.04 0.16 0.75 0.56 0.42 0.25 0.55 -0.17 -0.09 -0.10 0.98 
Note: Diagonal numbers are the square root of the AVE values. Off-diagonal numbers are the correlations among latent constructs.  
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Appendix D. Multigroup Analysis of Path Models 
Table D1. Multigroup Analysis of Path Models 
Path 
Difference in Path Coefficient 
(Δβ) p Value of Difference 
C-D C-F D-F C vs. D C vs. F D vs. F 
H1: Offender motivation → Intention 0.038 0.074 0.036 0.612 0.685 0.608 
H2: Target suitability → Intention 0.235 0.082 0.154 0.023 0.268 0.900 
H3: Capable guard. → Intention 0.154 0.147 0.301 0.941 0.074 0.002 
H5a: Low self-control  → Offender motivation 0.101 0.050 0.051 0.199 0.333 0.680 
H5b: Low self-control  → Suitable target 0.314 0.206 0.108 0.024 0.098 0.778 
H6a: Hacking self-efficacy → Offender motivation 0.117 0.170 0.052 0.797 0.906 0.663 
H6b: Hacking self-efficacy → Target suitability 0.204 0.151 0.052 0.929 0.851 0.344 
H6c: Hacking self-efficacy → Capable guard. 0.079 0.166 0.087 0.178 0.046 0.160 
H7a: Deterrence → Target suitability 0.011 0.067 0.056 0.535 0.678 0.645 
H7b: Deterrence → Capable guard. 0.086 0.031 0.054 0.937 0.696 0.169 
Age → Intention 0.013 0.059 0.046 0.434 0.288 0.319 
Gender → Intention 0.172 0.010 0.182 0.978 0.457 0.008 
IS Security Exp. → Intention 0.039 0.068 0.029 0.350 0.254 0.365 
Employment → Intention 0.020 0.015 0.035 0.412 0.562 0.656 
Note: C = Client, D = Design, F = Finance.  
Bolded p-values are significant ( < 0.05) and relate to at least one significant path. 
The above table only includes those main effect paths since comparing the path coefficients of a two-way interaction term (such as moral 
beliefs*offender motivation) between two scenarios is equivalent of examining a three-way interaction (such as moral beliefs*offender 
motivation*scenario), which is hard to interpret. 
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Appendix E: Survey Scenarios 
Stealing and Selling Client Data 
Chris was a database administrator in your company. His best friend was a management consultant specializing in 
streamlining and cost reduction for organizational clients. This friend asked Chris if he could provide a list of suppliers 
or clients that do business with your company. Chris was aware that company policies prohibit disclosing client 
information to third parties. Since the friend worked in a different industry, i.e., not a competitor of the company, Chris 
wanted to help. He was able to download the information for her friend. 
Stealing and Selling Product Design Data 
Daniel was a senior engineer in your company. His former colleague, who quit the company and joined a competitor 
a few years ago, approached him and asked if he could provide information about a key part in a new product your 
company had developed. The former colleague promised a fully paid vacation for Daniel and his family. Daniel’s 
family hasn’t had a vacation for some time, and he really wanted to make his family happy. Daniel was able to 
download the information from his office computer and gave it to the former colleague. 
Stealing and Selling Financial Data 
Deborah worked as an executive administrative assistant to the CFO in your company. She has a college classmate 
who worked in a Wall Street investment firm managing a multibillion-dollar portfolio. Three days before the scheduled 
public release of the third-quarter earnings, Deborah got a call from the friend asking if she could provide the data to 
him before the public release date, and promised a significant payoff in return. She was aware that the company policies 
prohibit disclosing financial data to outsiders before they are publicly released. Since Deborah’s husband had been laid 
off and had been without a job for a while, they were in financial distress. Deborah was able to locate and copy the 
quarterly report file and called the friend about the data after she went home that day.  
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